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The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of
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David E. Steinberg"
I. INTRODUCTION
Two bodies of law primarily determine where the parties will
litigate a federal court suit. The law of personal jurisdiction im-
poses one set of limitations; a court may enter a judgment only if
the defendant possesses some relationship to the forum.' Under
personal jurisdiction principles, any state with which defendants
possesses "minimum contacts" typically may assert jurisdiction
over the defendant.2
But even if a court possesses personal jurisdiction, and assum-
ing the subject matter is properly before the court, a plaintiff
nonetheless may be unable to proceed against the defendant in
that forum.' The defendant may move for a change of venue,
* Visiting Professor, The University of Pittsburgh School. of Law. B.A., North-
western University, 1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1986.
The author would like to express special thanks to Professor Rhonda S. Wasserman
of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Professor Wasserman's detailed and per-
suasive substantive comments led to significant improvements in this article.
The author is also indebted to research assistants Sean P. Roman and Janet V.
Northey. The thorough research and careful editing performed by Sean and Janet was
invaluable.
1 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) ("[T]he relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation . . . [has become] the central concern of
the inquiry into personal jurisdiction."); Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism
in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REv. 689, 691-92 (1987); Stewart, Forum
Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Rule, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1986).
2 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
3 The requirement that a plaintiff initially file suit in a proper venue represents
another geographical limitation on federal suits. Proper venue in most federal cases is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988). See generally Scidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Hearing Federal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue
Restrictions, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 82 (1968).
Proper venue represents a requirement distinct from personal juirisdiction. Personal
jurisdiction refers to the authority of the courts to bind a defendant to a judgment,
while venue refers to the convenience of the court as a site for litigation. See, e.g.,
Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipping Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); but cf. Stein, Fo-
rum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of the Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
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under section 1404 of the judicial code.4 Pursuant to this statute,
a transferor court may send a case to a transferee district5 "[f]or
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."6
781, 800-01 (1985). In some cases, venue may be improper, even though the court pos-
sesses personal jurisdiction over all defendants. See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
The vast majority of motions to transfer are brought by defendants. Courts have
held that a plaintiff, as well as a defendant, may move to transfer a case. See generally
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). A plaintiff often will file a motion to .
transfer after learning that the selected forum lacks personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant. The plaintiff then may seek to transfer the case to a forum that possesses personal
jurisdiction over all defendants. See, e.g., Saylor v. Dyniewski, 836 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir.
1988) (denying plaintiffs' motion to transfer, where Illinois courts lacked personal juris-
diction over the defendant); Schwilm v. Holbrook, 661 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1981) (granting
plaintiff's motion to transfer her suit from Pennsylvania to West Virginia, where Pennsyl-
vania courts may have lacked personal jurisdicton over the defendant).
This article addresses the more typical § 1404 transfer motion filed by a defendant.
Such a motion does not assert that a case cannot proceed in the court chosen by the
plaintiff. Instead, the defendant's motion argues that another forum would provide a
more convenient site for litigation. The issues raised by i plaintiffs transfer motion are
beyond the scope of this article.
5 Opinions have referred to the court receiving a transferred case as the "transfer-
ee court." This article attempts to spare the reader from this jargon whenever possible.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). The § 1404 motion to transfer grew out of the com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens, which authorized the dismissal of a suit
filed in an inconvenient forum. See infra text accompanying notes 19-37.
Section 1404 only authorizes a district court to transfer a case "to any other dis-
trict or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). A feder-
al court cannot effect a § 1404 transfer to the courts of a foreign county, because the
foreign courts are not another "district or division" of the federal courts. Kaufman, Ob-
servations on Transfers Under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 592, 600
(1949). Where the courts of a foreign country would provide a more convenient forum,
a district court may dismiss'the suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See,
e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 201 (1981) (forum non conveniens motion to
dismiss granted, where a trial in Scotland would prove more convenient); Kempe v.
Ocean Drilling & Ocean Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.) (dismissing suit filed
in the Eastern District of Louisiana, because Bermuda would provide a more convenient
forum), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 270 (1989); Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 811 F.2d
127 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
because the Philippines would provide an appropriate forum).
State courts also continue to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
doctrine authorizes a state court to dismiss a suit, where the courts of another state
would provide a more convenient site for litigation. See, e.g., Mclain v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 121 11. 2d 278, 520 N.E.2d 368, 374, (1988) (dismissing case under the forum
non conveniens doctrine, where "the circumstances in this case strongly favor Tennessee
as the more convenient forum"); Szmyd v. Szmyd, 641 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1982) (dismissing
suit brought in Alaska, where the California courts would provide a more convenient
forum). See also Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245
(1984) (granting forum non conveniens motion, and dismissing suit brought against the
former ruler of Iran by the current Iranian government), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108
(1985).
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In theory, the law of personal jurisdiction and the change of
venue statute are complimentary provisions. Personal jurisdiction
provides the plaintiff with a broad choice of forum, requiring
only some "minimum contacts" between the defendant and any
forum that the plaintiff has chosen.' However, where the plaintiff
has chosen a district arbitrarily or to harass a defendant, the de-
fendant may seek. a transfer to a more convenient federal dis-
trict.,
The law of personal jurisdiction has undergone a carefully
scrutinized, if not always coherent, development. The Supreme
Court frequently has re-examined the proper standards for the
A forum non conveniens dismissal may impose a greater hardship on a plaintiff
than a § 1404 transfer. For various reasons, including the possible expiration of statutes
of limitations, a plaintiff whose suit is dismissed under forum non conveniens may be
unable to prosecute his suit in any forum. Conversely, a plaintiff whose suit is trans-
ferred may continue to litigate his suit in another federal court.
Because a forum non conveniens dismissal carries implications different from a §
1404 transfer, the issues raised by the doctrine of forum non conveniens are beyond the
scope of this article. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 258 n.26 ("dismissals on grounds of forum
non conveniens and § 1404(a) transfers are not directly comparable."). See also id. at
253-54.
7 A tenuous connection between a defendant and the forum state may satisfy the
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts. A defendant may be subject to personal
jurisdiction even through he never has entered the forum state. See, e.g., Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (upholding personal jurisdiction over franchise owners in
Florida, even though owners had no physical presence in Florida); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (New Hampshire courts possessed personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant magazine publisher, where the defendant's only contact with state
was the monthly sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines in New Hampshire). But see Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (California court did not pos-
sess personal jurisdiction over a Japanese company, which maintained no offices in Cali-
fornia).
8 Section 1404 authorizes a transfer from a court that possesses personal jurisdic-
tion over all defendants, and is a proper venue for the suit. Where a plaintiff has filed
suit in an improper venue, a federal court either may dismiss or transfer the suit. 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988). A venue dismissal may have a severe effect on a plaintiff's abil-
ity to litigate a dispute, particulary if the relevant statute of limitations in a proper ven-
ue has expired. A court that is not a proper venue sometimes will transfer a suit, pursu-
ant to § 1406, rather than dismiss the case. See, e.g., Coldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S.
463, 466 (1962) (§ 1406 authorizes a transfer "however wrong the plaintiff may have
been in filing his case to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal
jurisdiction over the defendants or not"); Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988);
Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1986).
A § 1406 transfer of a case filed in an improper court raises different issues than
a § 1404 transfer. The issues raised by a § 1406 transfer are beyond the scope of this
article.
1990]
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exercise of personal jurisdiction.9 The law of personal jurisdiction
has received a regular review in scholarly works."0
Despite the deluge of motions to transfer litigated in the
lower federal courts," the methodology employed to resolve
such motions has received little attention. The Supreme Court
rarely has addressed section 1404 transfers, and the few Court
opinions that discuss the proper legal standards 'do so in only the
most general terms.1 Legal scholars have ignored the motion to
transfer. 3 As a result, the development of proper standards to
govern the transfer of cases has been left to the lower federal
courts, and almost exclusively to the district courts. 4
This article reviews the law governing- section 1404 motions,
and concludes that this body of law is in chaos. The ad hoc bal-
ancing employed by the district courts precludes any prediction
on whether a particular transfer motion will succeed. This lack of
9 See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. 102; Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Keeton, 465 U.S. 770.
10 See, e.g., Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uni-
form Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984); Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal
Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981); Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988); Weisburg, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 377 (1985).
11 The federal courts ordered more than 3,000 § 1404 transfers each year between
1985 and 1989.
Year Number of Transfers
Fiscal Year Ending 6/30/85 3,728
Fiscal Year Ending 6/30/86 3,409
Fiscal Year Ending 6/30/87 3,773
Fiscal Year Ending 6/30/88 4,126
Fiscal Year Ending 6/30/89 3,765
Letter to David E. Steinberg from Charles D. Gentry, Assistant Chief, Statistical Analysis
and Reports Division, Adminstrative Office of the United States Courts (March 8, 1990)
[copy on file with author]. The roughly 3,700 § 1404 transfers ordered in 1988-89 repre-
sent a more than 100% increase from the roughly 1,700 annual transfers ordered ten
years early. Marcus, Conflicts Among the Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial
System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 680 & n.16 (1984) (citing transfer statistics from 1974 through
1982). See also Kaufman, supra note 6, at 595.
These figures report only cases actually transferred, and do not take into account
the large number of unsuccessful § 1404 motions.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 47-107.
13 Recent scholarly pieces discussing § 1404 are almost nonexistent. But see
Waggoner, Section 1404(a), 'Where It Might Been Brought:. Brought By Whom?, 1988 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 67. Very few scholarly considerations of the § 1404 motion have appeared since
the 1960s. See, e.g., Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or
Injustice?, 40 IND. LJ. 99 (1965).
Recent scholarship has devoted considerably more attention to the related but dis-
tinct doctrine of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 3; Stewart, supra note
1.
14 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 136-37.
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standards invites a defendant to seek a transfer even when the
plaintiff has chosen a reasonable forum. Today, the motion to
transfer often has little relationship to the "interests of justice." 5
Instead, such motions have become a vehicle for defendant delay
and an increasing burden on' the already backlogged federal
courts.
Part I of this Article examines the development of the section
1404 transfer. Part I reviews the Supreme Court's repeated state-
ments that transfer decisions should be left to the discretion of
the district courts. Part I concludes by examining the Supreme
Court's single specific limitation on section 1404 transfers, which
authorizes transfers only to a district where the suit "might have
been brought." 6 The Article concludes that this limitation rarely
will apply and is inappropriate.
Given the Supreme Court's failure to provide any standards
for resolving transfer motions, Part II considers three other possi-
ble sources of such standards: (1) the defendants sued in civil liti-
gation; (2) the district courts; and (3) the federal appeals courts.
Part II concludes that none of these actors have promoted or are
likely to promote a coherent motion to transfer. In support of
this conclusion, Part II reviews two recurring types of inappropri-
ate transfers.
Given these improper transfer decisions, Part III of the Arti-
cle turns to the multi-factor balancing test used to decide transfer
motions. Part III examines four factors typically considered by the
district courts in resolving a motion to transfer: (1) whether the
plaintiff has brought suit in his district of residence; (2) whether
the suit is governed by the law of the forum state or by the law
of another state; (3) whether the district where the plaintiff has
brought suit possesses a more or less congested docket than an
alternative district; and (4) whether a related case is pending in
another district.
Part III notes that different lower court decisions have placed
a vastly different emphasis on each of these factors. But Part III
concludes that even if the lower courts agreed on the importance
of each factor, reliance on these distinctions still would not pro-
duce appropriate results. Each of the four factors discussed actual-
ly has little bearing on whether a particular district may provide a
convenient forum for litigation. After re-examining the relation-
15 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
16 Hoffman v. Baski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
1990] .447
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ship between the law of personal jurisdiction and the section 1404
transfer, Part III concludes that courts should abandon the cur-
rent method of deciding transfer motions.
Part IV of this Article urges courts to replace the current
bouillabaisse of factors used to resolve transfer motions with a
few simple rules. Courts should decide most transfer motions only
by considering the location of relevant witnesses and documents.
In addition, courts should transfer a case only to a district where
the plaintiff possesses minimum contacts. Finally, this concluding part
proposes that if a valid forum selection clause applies, a judge
automatically should transfer a case to the court specified in the
forum selection clause.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTION TO TRANSFER
A. The Motion to Transfer and the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens
Until 1948, no motion to transfer was available to civil liti-
gants in federal court.17 Before this time, a transfer provision
probably would have served little purpose. Under the narrow in-
terpretation of personal jurisdiction embraced during the late
nineteenth century, a plaintiff typically could bring suit only in
the defendant's state of domicile. 8 This rule precluded most
plaintiffs from filing a suit in an inconvenient forum, distant from
the defendant's residence.
In 1945, the Supreme Court explicitly abandoned this restric-
tive view of personal jurisdiction. The Court adopted the modern
rule that a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in any
state with which the defendant possesses "minimum- contacts."' 9
17 Marcus, supra note 11, at 679.
18 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
The primary exception to this rule authorized personal jurisdicion over non-resi-
dents receiving personal service of process while physically present in the forum state.
See Burham v. Superior Court 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2110-17 (1990). Cf id. at 2123 (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("[flor most of the 19th century, American courts did not uniformaly
recognized the concept of transient jurisdiction").
In Burham, the Court held that personal service on a defendant physically present
in the forum state is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, even if the defendant's
presence in the forum state lasts only for a short period of time. Id. at 2115-17.
19 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (upholding per-
sonal jurisdiction over a corporation, where between 11 and 13 of the corporation's
permanent salesmen worked and lived within the State of Washington, displayed the
corporation's shoes in permanent display rooms, and sold a substantial volume of the
corporation's shoes within the state).
(V/ol. 66:443
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This expansion of personal jurisdiction was accompanied by con-
cerns that plaintiffs might now bring suit in a forum that pos-
sessed few connections with the parties or the underlying dis-
pute.2" The "forum shopping" plaintiff might choose a distant
court, hoping to benefit from some unique legal doctrine. Or the
plaintiff might choose a distant forum merely to harass the defen-
dant, perhaps forcing a quick gettlement of a marginal suit.2'
Many commentators viewed the case of Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Kepner,22 as a prime example of such harassment.23
The Supreme Court's Kepner decision arose out of a suit under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act,24 brought by an injured em-
ployee. The plaintiff, an Ohio resident, was injured while working
in Butler County, Ohio. The plaintiff brought suit in the Eastern
District of New York, asserting personal jurisdiction because the
"defendant railroad was doing business in the New York district
where the same suit was filed."
25
In Kepner, the defendant Baltimore & Ohio Railroad sought
an injunction in an Ohio state court, which would have prevented
the plaintiff from continuing his Eastern District of New York
suit.26 'The Ohio state court denied the injunction, and the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court affirmed. In support of its holding, the
Kepner Court wrote: "[T]he federal courts have felt they could not
interfere with suits in far federal districts where the inequity al-
leged was based only on inconvenience. '27
The federal courts subsequently developed the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which authorized dismissal of a suit where
another court would provide a more convenient forum.28 In
20 See J. MOORE, MOORE'S JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY 202 (1949).
At the same time that the Supreme Court expanded personal jurisdiction, Congress
adopted statutes relaxing traditional limitations on the proper venue for certain types of
suits. For example, the Federal Employers' Liability Act allowed an injured railroad em-
ployee to bring suit "in the district of residence of the defendant, or in which the cause
of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of com-
mencing such action." 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1988). See also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
21 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("A plaintiff sometimes is
under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place
for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself."); Braucher, The Inconvenient
Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV.-908, 930-31 (1947).
22 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
23 See J. MOORE, supra note 20, at 205-06; Braucher, supra note 21, at 935.
24 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
25 Baltimore & Ohio R.R, 314 U.S. at 48.
26 Id. at 48, 50.
27 Id. at 53.
28 Masington, Venue in the Federal Courts-The Problem of the Inconvenient Forum, 15
1990]
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Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Co.,29  the plaintiff brought a
shareholder's derivative action in the Eastern District of New
York, alleging self-dealing by an officer of defendant
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company. The individual and cor-
porate defendants named in Koster all resided in Illinois."
The Supreme Court's Koster opinion noted that Illinois con-
tained the relevant "books, records and witnesses."31 In addition,
the Court observed that the Koster plaintiff was "utterly silent as
to any reason of convenience to himself or to witnesses and as to
any advantage to him in expense, speed of trial, or adequacy of
remedy if the case were tried in New York. ' 32 The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of the Koster action on forum non
conveniens grounds.33
The forum non conveniens dismissal granted in Koster could
result in severe prejudice to a plaintiff.34 Courts premised forum
non conveniens dismissals on the assumption that the plaintiff
could refile his action in a more convenient forum. However,
while the plaintiff litigated a forum non conveniens motion, the
applicable statutes of limitations in other forums would continue
to run. By the time a court had ordered a forum non conveniens
dismissal, the relevant limitations period in any alternative forum
might have expired, leaving the plaintiff without any court that
would hear his suit. In addition, a defendant might not be subject
to personal jurisdiction in an alternative forum. 35 Forum non
U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 237 (1961). The doctrine of forum non conveniens continues to
authorize dismissals of federal court actions in which .the courts in a foreign nation
would provide a more convenient forum. Id. at 239; Stein, supra note 3, at 831-40; supra
note 6.
29 330 U.S. 501, 518 (1947).
30 Id. at 519.
31 Id. at 526.
32 Id. at 531.
33 See also Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson, 285 U.S. 413, 423-24 (1932) (dismissing
an admiralty case, on forum non conveniens grounds, where all the parties resided in
Canada).
34 See Masington, supra note 28, at 238 ("This procedure is indeed harsh for, while
forum non conveniens presupposes the existence of another forum where the defendant
can be served, there is no guarantee that the defendant will be available for service, and
a stipulation to that effect by the defendant is not a prerequisite to dismissal."); Note,
Appellate Review of § 1404(a) Orders-Misuse of an Extraordinay Writ, 1 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAc. & PROc. 297, 297 (1968).
35 See Masington, supra note 28, at 238; Waggoner, supra note 13, at 84.
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conveniens dismissals thus were not favored, 6 and courts often
declined to grant such motions.
3 7
In 1948, Congress authorized transfer of cases brought in
inconvenient courts by adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1404,8 which pro-
vides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought. 9
Because section 1404 provides for a transfer, rather. than a dis-
missal, the plaintiff will not face personal jurisdiction or statute of
limitations problems."
36 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 42 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Koster
may be regarded as an extreme decision in depriving a plaintiff of his home forum");
Marcus, supra note 11, at 679.
37 See, e.g., United States v. National City lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948) (refusing to
dismiss an antitrust suit brought in the Southern District of California, where the defen-
"dants asserted that the Northern District of Illinois would have provided a more conve-
nient forum); Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946) (reversing
forum non conveniens dismissal, where the plaintiffs brought suit in New York against a
Wisconsin corporation); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (federal court
should not have dismissed suit, on the ground that the Florida state courts would pro-
vide a superior forum for litigation); Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 700,
706 (1942) (the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not authorize Tennessee courts to
enjoin a plaintiff from bringing suit in Missouri).
38 See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 598; Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice of
the Most Convenient Forum, 15 RUTGERS L REv. 607, 610 (1961); Stein, supra, note 3, at
808; Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 34 VA. L. REV. 811, 821 (1948).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 1404 have proven far
less important than paragraph (a). J. MOORE, supra note 20, at 201. Section 1404(b)
authorizes the transfer of a case "from the division in which it is pending to any other
division of the same district." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1988). Section 1404(c) provides for
the trial of a civil action "at any place within the division in which it is pending." 28
U.S.C. § 1404(c) (1988).
The same Congress that adopted § 1404 also enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1988). Sec-
tion 1404 authorizes a transfer when the court chosen by a plaintiff is a proper venue
for his suit. Under § 1406, a court either may dismiss or transfer a suit filed in an im-
proper venue. See also supra note 8.
40 See Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) ("A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with
respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms."); Masington, supra note 28, at 238
("When a district court orders an action to be transferred, the transferee court picks up
the case where the transferor court left it.").
Congress adopted section 1404 as part of the Judiciary Act of 1948. For a general
review of the 1948 Act, see J. MOORE, supra note 20. Among other things, this extensive
bill altered federal court subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1335
(1988) (Historical and Revision Notes) changed the grounds for removing a case from
state court to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (Historial and Revision Notes), and
revised the procedure for obtaining review of a criminal conviction on a writ of habeas
corpus.
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Congress appended a brief "Reviser's Note" to section 1404.
The Note cites Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Kepner41 as an exam-
ple "of the need of such a provision." 42 Otherwise, the Reviser's
Note largely quotes the language of section 1404.43 Very little
additional legislative history discusses the transfer statute.4
The section 1404 transfer assumes that the long-run efficiency
gains resulting from the litigation of a case in a more convenient
forum will outweigh the immediate costs that accompany a trans-
fer. Every transfer order will impose some short-term costs. A
new judge must familiarize himself with the facts in dispute, re-
peating work already undertaken by the judge who transferred
the case. The parties will probably need to hire local counsel in
the district receiving the case,45 and local counsel must repeat a
background review of the case already conducted by the attorneys
initially retained. The process of transmitting the case files from
one district to another, as well as the process of assigning the
case to a new judge, invariably will delay a suit.46
Such immediate costs may be recovered if the convenience of
a new district will result in litigation proceeding with greater
speed and less expense. On the other hand, such immediate costs
will not be recovered if a second district is no more convenient
than the district initially chosen by the plaintiff.
41 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
42 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (Historical and Revision Notes).
43 "The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is neces-
sary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest
of justice to do so." Id.
One treatise describes the Reviser's Note as "not particularly illuminating." 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3841 (1986).
44 See Ferens 110 S. Ct. at 1280 (noting the "scant legislative history of § 1404(a)");
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 40 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no
legislative record of opposition to the adoption of § 1404(a)."); Korbel, supra note 38, at
613 (describing the "sparse legislative history" of section 1404); Waggoner, supra note 13,
at 80-81.
45 See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
46 See Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 328 (1989); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Savoy Industries, 587 F.2d 1149, 1156
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979) ("The court here had a familiarity with
allegations, characters, lawyers, and previous history of [the] litigation."). See generally 15
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3841 (In authorizing a discretionary
motion to transfer, "[t]he greatest cost is that an extra decision point has been added in
already complex litigation.").
[Vol. 66:443
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B. The Supreme Court and the Motion to Transfer
1. A Deference to District Court Discretion
Supreme Court review of transfer motions has occurred rare-
ly and has proven unilluminating. With one exception,47 the
Court has insisted on a simple deference to district court transfer
decisions." The Court has not developed workable standards for
limiting or reviewing this district court discretion.
The Court decision that has most influenced motion to trans-
fer analysis did not involve section 1404, but instead involved a
forum non conveniens motion.49 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,50
the plaintiff alleged that defendant Gulf Oil negligently allowed a
fire to start at its Lynchburg, Virginia storage site, resulting in a
gasoline explosion that destroyed the plaintiffs adjacent ware-
house.51 The plaintiff, a Lynchburg resident, brought this action
in the Southern District of New York. Defendant Gulf Oil was a
Pennsylvania corporation that did business in both Virginia and
New York.52 Gulf Oil sought to dismiss the suit on forum non
conveniens grounds. Gulf Oil prevailed in the district court, but
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision.53
In Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit
and upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the suit. In
reviewing the standards for a forum non coveniens dismissal,
Justice Robert H. Jackson's majority opinion observed: "Wisely, it
has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will
justify or require either a grant or denial of remedy."54 Justice
Jackson continued that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
47 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). For a discussion and criticism of the re-
sult in Hoffman, see infra text accompanying notes 78-105.
48 The language of section 1404, which authorizes any transfer "in the interest of
justice," may be read as a grant of broad discretion to the district courts. See J. MOORE,
supra note 20, at 210 ("[A district court's] discretionary ruling should not, be reviewed
except on the most clear showing of subsequently developed facts or other circumstances
warranting a departure from the settled ruling."); Masington,. supra note 28, at 240. On
some problems raised .by such an interpretation, see infra text accompanying notes 181-
232.
49 See Waggoner, supra note 13, at 69 (noting the relationship between § 1404
transfers and the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
50 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The Gulf Oil decision was. announced on the same day as
the decision in Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
51 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 502-03.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 503.
54 Id. at 508.
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properly "leaves much to the discretion of the court to which [a]
plaintiff resorts."55
Justice Jackson then presented a laundry list of factors rele-
vant to a forum non conveniens dismissal. The majority opinion
divided these factors into two groupings. The first grouping, the
"private interest of the litigant," included factors such as "the
relative ease of access to sources of proof," and the "availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses."56 The second group
of considerations, "factors of public interest," included the varying
degree of docket congestion in different courts, the relationship
between the forum chosen by the plaintiff and the underlying
controversy, and whether the law of the forum state or the law of
a different state would apply to the suit.5
The Gulf Oil opinion concluded that the plaintiff had brought
suit in New York only because a Virginia jury might be hesitant
to return the $400,000 damage award sought by the plaintiff."
After reviewing the limited connections between New York and
the underlying dispute, the majority opinion concluded that "the
District Court did not exceed its powers or the bounds of its
discretion in dismissing plaintiff's complaint . .. .""
During the 1950s and early 1960s, a scattering of Supreme
Court opinions on section 1404 applied the Gulf Oil policy of
deference." An example of such deference to district court
transfer decisions appears in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick.6' The three
Norwood plaintiffs worked for defendant Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Company as dining car employees. The plaintiffs allegedly
sustained injuries when a train that the defendant owned, and in
which the plantiffs were working, derailed near Dillon, South
Carolina. 2 The plaintiffs, one of them a Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia resident, filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 3
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 508-09.
58 Id. at 510.
59 Id. at 512. On the continuing importance of the Guy Oil opinion, see J. MOORE,
supra note 20, at 208-09.
60 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (affirming district judge's transfer
order); Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960) (same); Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) (same). See also Kitch, supra note 13, at 132 ("Apparently
the district courts have followed the lead of Moore's Federal Practice, which lists the fac-
tors discussed in Gulf Oil as controlling 'Grounds for Transfer under § 1404(a).'").
61 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
62 Id. at 29-30.
63 Id. at 33 (Clark, J., dissenting). The other two plaintiffs were domiciled in Wash-
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The defendant moved to transfer the suit to the Eastern District
of South Carolina. The district judge granted this motion, and
was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.64
In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
judge's decision. The Norwood Court simply stated: "[W]e agree
that the district judge correctly construed the statute in evaluating
the evidence, [and] we do not find it necessary to detail the facts
considered by him in reaching his judgment." 5 In dissent, Jus-
tice Clark complained: "The opinion of the Court ... goes far to-
ward assigning to the trial judge the choice of forums, a preroga-
tive which has previously rested with the plaintiff."6
After the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court did not consider
another section 1404 case for more than 20 years. The Court
occasionally referred to the section 1404 transfer as a counter-
weight to the broad choice of forum available to a plaintiff under
expansive interpretations of personal jurisdiction." But the
Court has said little else about section 1404.
The Court recently reexamined the section 1404 transfer in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,6" but this decision does
little to clarify the standards governing motions to transfer.69
Stewart Organization, Inc. an Alabama corporation, had entered
into a contract to market the copier products of Ricoh Corpo-
ration, which maintained its principal place of business in New
Jersey. The contract included a forum-selection clause "providing
that any dispute arising out of the contract could be brought only
in a court located in Manhattan."7 Stewart Organization none-
theless filed suit against Ricoh Corp. in the Northern District of
Alabama, alleging a breach of contract, antitrust violations, and
various state law causes of action.7'
ington, D.C.
64 Id. at 30.
65 Id. at 32.
66 Id. at 37.
67 See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). See also Seidelson,
supra note 3, at 87.
68 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
69 See also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). Ferens dealt only with
a choice-of-law problem raised by a transfer, and not with the standards governing trans-
fer decisions.
70 Stewart Organization, 487 U.S. at 24.
71 The federal district court possessed diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state
law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), and subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
antitrust claim pursuant to a federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988). The Court would
have reached the same result regardless of whether the district court's subject matter
1990]
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Defendant Ricoh Corp. sought to transfer this suit from the
Northern District of Alabama to the Soutern Distirct of New
York, relying heavily on the forum selection clause. The district
court held that the case was governed by Alabama state law,
which "looks unfavorably upon forum selection clauses," 72 rather
than federal law, which authorizes the enforcement of such claus-
es. Holding that the forum selection clause should not receive sig-
nificant weight, the district court thus denied the motion to trans-
fer.
In Stewart Organization, the Court was presented with the
narrow issue of whether the district court should assess the forum
selection clause under federal law or Alabama state law. The Stew-
art Organization opinion held that federal law, rather than Ala-
bama state law, should govern the forum selection clause. 73 The
Court did not determine whether to transfer the case to the
Southern District of New York, but instead directed the district
court to reconsider its decision rejecting the defendant's transfer
motion. 4
In discussing the section 1404 transfer, Stewart Organization
approved Justice Jackson's Gulf Oil analysis, which "calls on the
district court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific
factors. '75 The majority opinion continued:
In its resolution of the 1404(a) motion in this case, for exam-
ple, the District Court will be called on to address such issues
as the convenience of a Manhattan forum given the parties'
expressed preferences for that venue, and the fairness of trans-
fer in light of the forum selection clause and the parties' rela-
tive bargaining power .... The District Court also must weigh
in the balance the convenience of the witnesses and those
public-interest factors of systemic integrity and fairness, that, in
addition to private concerns, come under the heading of 'the
jurisdiction was based on § 1332 or § 1337. Stewart Organization, 487 U.S. at 26 n.3.
72 Id. at 24.
73 Id. at 32. Justice Scalia dissented from this holding. Id. at 38.
74 Id. at 32. The Court did not decide whether the forum selection clause was val-
id. Id. The Court wrote that the presence of an enforceable forum selection clause
should be a "significant factor" considered in a transfer decision. Id. at 30. However, the
Court also stated: "It is conceivable in a particular case . . . [that] a district court acting
under § 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a case notwithstanding the counterweight of a
forum-selection clause . . . ." Id. at 30-31.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy urged that a valid forum selec-
tion. clause should be "given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional circum-
stances." Id. at 33. See also infra text accompanying note 376.
75 Id. at 29.
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interest of justice.' 5
In Stewart Organization, the Court thus failed to develop any
more concrete transfer standards than the "case-specific," ad hoc
balancing advanced in past precedents. Stewart Organization may
not have represented the appropriate controversy for a revision of
these standards. The Stewart Organization decision primarily in-
volved a choice-of-law issue, and the lower courts had not under-
taken any extensive consideration of appropriate transfer motion
standards." On the other hand, the Court's explicit approval of
case-by-case balancing may discourage any future attempt to devel-
op a more predictable -and consistent approach to section 1404
motions.
In general, the Court has declined to develop meaningful
standards governing transfer motions, deferring instead to, the
discretion of the district courts. The next Section considers the
only Supreme Court decision that has imposed a clear restriction
on section 1404 transfers.
2. The Court's Limitation on Motions to Transfer: The Hoffman
Rule
The only specific Supreme Court limitation on section 1404
transfer motions appears in Hoffrman v. Blaski. In Hoffman, the
Court proscribed transfers to any district where personal jurisdic-
tion or venue was not authorized. Because the Hoffman rule pro-
vides no protection to the plaintiff, . the party potentially preju-
diced by a defendant's section 1404 transfer motion, the 'Hoffman
rule is an inappropriate limitation on the motion to transfer.
Any law student is familiar with the adage of justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes: "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law."
79
But Hoffman v. Blaski might be cited for a corollary proposition:
"Strange cases make bad law." The Hoffman plaintiffs, Illinois resi-
dents, brought a patent infringement action against defendant R.
P. Howell and the Lifetime Metal Building Company, a Texas
corporation controlled, by Howell. Howell was a" resident of Dallas,
76 Id. at 29-30.
77 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., No. 84-AR-2460-S (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 1985),
rev'd, 779 F.2d 643 (11th Cir.), vacated, 785 F.2d 896 (11th Cir. 1986), -ev'd, 810 F.2d
1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), af'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
78 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
79 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
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Texas, and Lifetime Metal Building maintained its only place of
business in Dallas.80
The plaintiffs filed their patent infringement suit in the
Northern District of Texas, where the defendants resided. In a
bizarre litigation strategy, the defendants moved to transfer the
case to the plaintiffs' district of residence, the Northern District
of Illinois.
In opposition to this motion, the plaintiffs argued that the
Texas court lacked authority to transfer the case to the Northern
District of Illinois. First, the plaintiffs asserted that the Illinois
court would lack personal jurisdiction over the defendants, be-
cause an Illinois court could not authorize the service of process
on the Texas defendants." Second, the plaintiffs asserted that
the Northern District of Illinois was not a proper venue for the
S~t82suit.s
The Texas district court granted the defendants' transfer
motion," the Fifth Circuit affirmed,"4 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.8 5 Upon receiving the Hoffman case, the North-
ern District of Illinois court denied "with misgivings" the
plaintiffs' motion to return the case to Texas. 6 On their fifth
attempt, the plaintiffs finally succeeded in opposing the transfer
order, with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Northern District of llinois 87
The Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit, dis-
agreed with the Fifth Circuit, and held that the Northern District
of Texas court had erred in transferring the suit to Illinois."8 In
reaching this decision, the Hoffman Court focused on one phrase
appearing in section 1404, which authorizes the transfer of a suit
to any district "where it might have been brought." 9
The Hoffman majority held that the Northern District of Illi-
nois did not qualify as a district where the suit "might have been
brought," because that court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
80 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 340.
81 Id. at 341-42 & n.11. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 4e, 4f.
82 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 341.
83 Id. at 337.
84 Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
85 Blaski v. Davidson, 355 U.S. 872 (1957).
86 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 338.
87 Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), afftd, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). See
also Masington, supra note 28, at 247 (summarizing the history of the Hoffman litigation).
88 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 342.
89 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
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defendants dnd was not a proper venue. 90 In dissent, Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter asserted that the Northern District of Illinois was
indeed a district where the suit "might have been brought," be-
cause the Hoffmnan defendants had waived any personal jurisdic-
tion and venue objections when they moved to transfer the case
to Illinois.9 The majority disagreed with Justice Frankfurter's
statutory interpretation: "We do not think that the § 1404(a)
phrase 'where it might have been brought' can be interpreted to
mean . . . 'where it may now be rebrought, with defendants' con-
sent."
92
The Hoffman decision might be defended as an attempt to
give some meaning to the plain language at secion 1404. The
statute authorizes a transfer to any district where a suit "might
have been brought."93 Nonetheless, most scholarly discussions of
Hoffman have harshly criticized the decision. 4
A consideration of the policy embodied in personal jurisdic-
tion and venue statutes indicates that Justice Frankfurter's dissent
was correct and the Hoffman majority was wrong. In the civil sys-
tem, the plaintiff possesses broad discretion in choosing the fo-
rum for his suit. This discretion is limited by the requirements of
personal jurisdiction and proper venue-requirements that pri-
marily protect the defendant.9 5 These requirements designed to
90 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 342-45. See also Masington, supra note 28, at 247; Waggoner,
supra note 13, at 70.
91 Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 351, 361 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (The
Northern District of Illinois court possessed "jurisdiction to adjudicate this action with
the defendantes acquiesence."). Sullivan was a companion case, decided together with
Hoffman. See Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 338-39.
92 Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 342-43.
93 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). But cf. Waggoner, supra note 13, at 75 (the Hoffman
decidion incorrectly interprets the language of section 1404).
94 See, e.g., 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3845, at 346
("The commentators have been harshly critical of Hoffman v. Blaski and lower courts
have not been unwilling to make their dislike for the decision known."); Korbel, supra
note 38, at 613 (the Hoffman opinion relies on "some rather bizzare reasoAing");
Waggoner, supra note 13, at 75 n.30, 77-87.
Some authors have noted that the Hoffman limitation did not apply under the com-
mon law doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Masington, supra note 28, at 248.
95 Se e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (personal jurisdiction "protects
the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum");
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) ("In most instances, the
purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a
plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.").
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protect the defendant should not bar a defendant's section 1404
transfer motion. 6
A hypothetical dispute may illustrate the inappropriateness of
the Hoffman rule. Paul's Paradise Foods, Inc. is a Hawaiian busi-
ness that sells tropical fruits to mainlanders by taking phone or-
ders. It sells fruit primarily to individuals living on the west coast
of the continental United States. The company never has taken an
order from anyone living east of the Missigsippi River.
The World-Wide Telephone Corporation provides the tele-
phone receivers used by Paul's Paradise Foods. World-Wide Tele-
phone is a Delaware corporation that maintains its principal place
of business in New York, New York. World-Wide Telephone also
maintains offices in Hawaii and most other states, but it does no
business in Arizona, New Mexico, or Utah.
The telephones sold by World-Wide Telephone to Paul's Para-
dise Foods allegedly malfunction. Paul's Paradise Foods loses sev-
eral thousand dollars in orders before the telephone failure is
discovered, diagnosed, and repaired. Paul's Paradise Foods brings
a federal court negligence suit against World-Wide Telephone in
the District of Hawaii, invoking the court's diversity jurisdic-
tion.9" World-Wide Telephone moves to transfer the suit filed by
Paul's Paradise Foods.
Under the Hoffman rule, the Hawaii district court would pos-
sess authority to transfer the suit brought by Paul's Paradise
Foods to New York, New York. A court in New York would pos-
sess personal jurisdiction over World-Wide Telephone, because
this corporation maintains its principal place of business of in
New York. The New York court also would provide a proper
venue for this suit." Under Hoffman, the Hawaii federal court
thus could transfer the case to New York, even though plaintiff
Paul's Paradise Foods lacks any contacts with New York.99
96 See Korbel, supra note 38, at 612.
97 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 1988).
98 Venue is proper in any federal district "where all defendants reside," among
other places. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1391(b) (1988). For venue purposes, "a defendant
that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). Because a New York court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over World-Wide Telephone, and World-Wide Tele-
phone is the only defendant in this case, a New York court would represent a proper
venue. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 541 F.2d 869, 871
(10th Cir. 1976).
99 A number of courts have transferred cases to districts where the plaintiff lacks
any contacts. See infra text accompanying notes 178-98.
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But the Hoffman rule would not allow the Hawaii court to
transfer the suit brought by Paul's Paradise Foods to Arizona. If
Paul's Paradise: Foods had brought its suit against World-Wide
Telephone in the District of Arizona, the federal district court
could not have asserted personal jurisdiction over World-Wide
Telephone, because this defendant lacked any contacts with the
state of Arizona. Under Hoffman, the District of Arizona would
not qualify as a district where the suit filed by Paul's Paradise
Foods "might have been brought."
The hypothetical case of Paul's Paradise Foods v. World-Wide
Telephone suggests two problems with the Hoffman rule. First, the
actual rule adopted in Hoffman seems unnecessary. Hoffman pre-
vents a transfer to a district where a defendant lacks contacts. But
with the exception of the occasional bizarre case such as Hoffman,
it is difficult to understand why a defendant would seek a transfer
to a forum where she lacked any contacts. 00 Even if a dtefen-
dant did file such a strange motion, litigation in the alternative
district probably would not facilitate "the convenience of the par-
ties and witnesses."0 1 The defendant would not reside in that
district, and presumably few or none of the defendant's possible
witnesses would reside in that district."0 2 Regardlesss of the
Hoffnan rule, a district court should deny such a transfer motion,
because the alternative forum would be no more convenient than
the district where the plaintiff first filed suit. 03
Second, the decision in Hoffman focuses on the wrong party.
Hoffman protects the defendant against a transfer to an inconve-
nient forum. But the defendant does not need this protection
where the defendant himself is seeking the transfer. As Justice
Frankfuter's Hoffman dissent asserts, if the defendant wishes to
litigate in a forum where he lacks any contacts, and that forum is
100 The Hoffman rule would make more sense in the relatively unusual case where
the plaintiff, and not the defendant, moved for a § 1404 transfer. See, e.g., Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). Here the defendant may suffer prejudice from
a transfer, arnd may require the protection afforded by the rules of personal jurisdiction
and venue. See infra text accompanying note 4.
101 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
102 In a case involving multiple defendants, the Hoffman rule could preclude a trans-
fer to a district where some, but not all of the defendants resided. A federal district
that serves as the residence of only some of the multiple defendants would qualify as a
proper venue only if the plaintiffs "claim arose" in that district, or if the plaintiff re-
sides in that district and has brought an action premised on diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1391(b) (1988) (bringing suit in a federal district where "all defen-
dants reside" constitutes one method for establishing proper venue).
103 See Korbel, supra note 38, at 612.
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somehow more convenient than the court chosen by the plaintiff,
it is hard to imagine how a transfer will prejudice the defen-
dant.10
4
Instead, the party who may suffer prejudice from a section
1404 transfer is the plaintiff-the party opposing the defendant's
motion. In the hypothetical dispute described above, Paul's Para-
dise Foods might suffer severe prejudice if the Hawaii court trans-
ferred the corporation's suit to New York, where Paul's Paradise
Foods lacks any contacts. But the Hoffman rule provides no pro-
tection to a plaintiff opposing a defendant's motion to trans-
fer. 5 A plaintiff's lack of contacts with a state in no way pre-
vents a transfer to a court in that state.1 6
C. Summary
The Supreme Court has declined to formulate specific rules
for deciding section 1404 transfer motions. Instead, the justices
have deferred to the discretion of the district courts, and have
encouraged these courts to decide transfer motions by balancing a
variety of factors on a case-by-case basis.
The Supreme Court's one specific limitation on section 1404
transfers, stated in Hoffman v. Blaski,10 7 will apply only in ex-
traordinary situations. In addition, the rule offers protection for
the defendant, the party seeking a transfer, rather than the plain-
tiff, the party who may suffer prejudice as a result of a transfer.
In short, the Supreme Court has failed to provide standards
that will result in predictable and consistent transfer decisions.
This Article next considers other potential sources for such stan-
dards.
II. SOURCES OF CONTROL
A dearth of Supreme Court opinions on a particular issue
will not inevitably result in lower court contradiction and chaos.
The following discussion identifies three potential sources of stan-
dards that would limit section 1404 transfers: (1) the civil defen-
dants, who may or may not file a motion to transfer; (2) the dis-
trict courts, which will first rule on a transfer motion; and (3) the
104 See Hoffman v. Sullivan, 363 U.S. 335, 360-62 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also Kaufman, supra note 6, at 604.
105 Waggoner, supra note 13, at 83-84 & n.58
106 See supra text accompanying notes 178-98.
107 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
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appellate courts. This discussion concludes that none of these
actors will impose significant limitations on the section 1404 trans-
fer.
The second part of this discussion examines two recurrent
problems raised by transfer decisions. First, courts have trans-
ferred cases to distant districts, resulting in prejudice to plaintiffs
who lack contacts with these districts. Second, courts have issued
multiple transfer orders, transferring a single case two or three
times. Such decisions demonstrate that courts need more specific
standards for deciding transfer motions.
A. The Civil Defendants
Civil defendants represent one possible source of limitation
on the number of transfers. Defendants might file section 1404
motions only when litigation in the forum chosen by the plaintiff
would impose a significant hardship. Where a plaintiff has made a
reasonable choice of forum, a transfer motion is unlikely to suc-
ceed and only will impose an unnecessary burden on both the
plaintiffs counsel and the federal courts.
Such a suggestion of. attorney restraint may seem terribly
naive given the prevalent sentiment that courts must sanction civil
attorneys to deter unwarranted pleadings and motions.10 Never-
theless, simply given that civil defendants will. abuse some mo-
tions, it does not necessarily follow that defendants will file inap-
propriate motions to transfer.
A defendant must pay his attorney to draft a transfer motion.
And even if the district court grants a defendant's motion to
transfer, the defendant has not achieved any substantive victory.
Instead, litigation simply will occur in another court. The section
1404 transfer motion conceivably might be classed with proce-
dures such as the motion to strike a pleading as containing "re-
108 The principal provision used for this purpose is Federal Rule 11. In 1983, Con-
gress amended rule 11 to provide, among other things, that the federal courts could
sanction attorneys who filed a pleading or motion "for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
FED. R. CiV. P. 11.
Since the 1983 amendment, rule 11 has generated a tremendous volume of litiga-
tion and a number of scholarly discussions. See generally Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended
Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions,
100 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1987); see also infra text accompanying notes 128-34.
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dundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. matter"1°-a
motion available to the defendant, but infrequently employed.
But sheer numbers demonstrate that transfer motions are not
an unimportant procedural anachronism."' If anything, defen-
dants appear likely to file a transfer motion almost as a matter of
course when some colorable argument exists that an alternative
forum could prove more convenient."' In both 1987 and 1988,
district courts published more than 100 opinions discussing §
1404 transfer motions." 2
This glut of transfer motions has not occurred because de-
fense counsel have hoodwinked their clients into paying for an
unnecessary procedural gimmick. Instead, the mere filing of a
transfer motion may provide important strategic benefits to a civil
defendant.
These strategic benefits result from the fact that a court typi-
cally will consider a motion to transfer prior to any other issue in
a case. Although no formal time limit governs transfer mo-
tions,' defendants should file a motion to transfer at the very
outset of litigation. An immediate transfer motion will prevent a
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(0.
110 See supra note 11.
111 As early as 1950, The Hon. Irving R. Kaufman observed: "The extensive use of
section 1404(a) can best be seen by the fact that few motions days in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York pass without several motions to transfer being argued." Kaufman,
supra note 6, at 595.
112 West's Federal Practice Digest lists about 100 transfer opinions published by the
district courts in 1987, and about 110 transfer opinions published in 1988. 46 WEST's
FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989). These figures understate the
actual number of published transfer opinions. The Federal Practice Digest does not in-
clude transfer decisions published only in looseleaf services and several other sources.
These published opinions represent only a small portion of district court transfer
decisions. District judges often will decide a § 1404 motion in an unpublished opinion,
or in an oral statement read from the bench.
113 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3844, at 334 ("Section
1404(a) sets no limit on the time at which a motion to transfer may be made."). See also
Martin-Trigona v. Meister, 668 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1987) (motion to transfer granted
after a jury found in favor of one defendant, but where a mistrial was declared as to
the other two defendants); Kolko v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 713, 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (defendant did not waive its right to bring a transfer motion, by undertaking
some discovery in the district where the plaintiff had filed suit); Genden v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 780, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (ordering a
transfer after the court had granted class certification, and after "some progress has
been made in discovery").
The defendant's ability to bring a motion to transfer even after a substantial delay
differs significantly from the federal rule governing personal jurisdiction. If a defendant
fails to raise a personal jurisdiction defense in either her answer or a pre-answer motion
to dismiss, the defendant will have waived this defense. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
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judge from wasting time on, a detailed examination of a case des-
tined for another district. Accordingly, some decisions have de-
nied transfer motions solely because a defendant delayed in filing
the motion.
1 1 4
Strictly read, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a
defendant to file either an answer or a motion to dismiss within
20 days after the plaintiff has served the defendant with a copy of
the complaint."1 Once the defendant files his 'answer to the
complaint, discovery will begin, and the defendant's counsel must
undertake the costly tasks of producing documents, answering
interrogatories, and attending depositions.
Conversely, filing a motion to dismiss will bring the plaintiff's
suit to a complete halt. If a court grants the defendant's motion
and dismisses the suit, the case will conclude and no discovery
will occur. Even if a court eventually denies the motion to dis-
miss, no discovery or other activity will occur while the motion
remains pending.
Such delay is valuable to a defendant, even in cases where
the defendant faces certain liability. Any defendant should prefer
to pay a judgment one year in the future, rather than pay the
judgment immediately. During the intervening year, the defendant
may keep money invested, and pocket the interest that her invest-
ments earn.
116
A rational defendant thus will file a motion to dismiss wher-
ever possible. But defendants may move to dismiss a complaint
only under a limited number of circumstances." As the Su-
114 McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1965) ("the court's
denial of the motions to transfer for untimeliness cannot be contended to be arbitrary");
Oral-B Laboratories, Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 611 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), af 'd in
part, mod. in part, 810 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1987) ("a preliminary injunction hearing has
already been held, and it seems unwise to transfer a case after initial substantive deci-
sions have already been made"); Meinerz v. Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co., 343 F. Supp.
681, 682 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (motion to transfer denied, where the motion was filed nine
months after the plaintiffs had initiated suit). See also Kitch, supra note 13, at 134;
Masington, supra note 28, at 245.
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a), 12(b).
116 This fact that one dollar in hand is worth'more than one dollar paid one year
in the future often is referred 'to as the "present value" of'assets. See P. SAMUELSON &
W. NORDHAUS, EcONOMICS 651-52 (11th ed. 1985).
117 Federal Rule 12(b) lists only seven grounds for a motion to dismiss: "(1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule
19." However, the rule 12(b)(6) motion-a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted"-in fact embraces a variety of arguments.
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preme Court has written: "[A] complaint should not be dis-
missed . . . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."' Frequently, the defense attorney will be unable
to afford his client the delay that will accompany a motion to
dismiss.
The defense attorney thus may use the motion to dismiss as
a means of delaying litigation." 9 Motions to transfer do not re-
ceive the same strict review as motions to dismiss. Instead, the
Supreme Court has provided the district courts with broad discre-
tion to grant or deny transfer motions. 2 ° A defense attorney
thus may seek a section 1404 transfer in any case where another
court could provide a more convenient forum.
A transfer motion typically will have the same delaying effect
as a motion to dismiss. While a transfer motion remains pending,
courts have stayed discovery,12' allowed defendants to postpone
filing an answer, 122 and deferred decisions on substantive mo-
tions. 23
118 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Accord Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
119 Ethics codes typically assert that attorneys must not take action for the sole pur-
pose of delaying litigation. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(1) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 comment (1989).
Two commentators have observed that such ethical provisions purportedly require "a
plausible legal purpose for any delaying tactics . . . though such a requirement is not
much of a hindrance in practice." Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of Laige Law
Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 419 n.24 (1985). An attorney probably may avoid
any ethical questions by asserting that the purpose of his § 1404 motion is to transfer a
suit to a preferable forum, rather than to delay the suit.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 47-107.
121 See, e.g., LaBrier v. A. H. Robins Co., 551 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D.D.C. 1982) (court
declines to resolve discovery motions and stays discovery, pending a transfer of the
case); Goodman v. Fleischmann, 364 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("Our courts
have uniformly held that the decision to transfer is preliminary to discovery on the mer-
its, and that motions to transfer should be acted upon at the threshold of the litiga-
tion.").
122 See, e.g., Dutchen v. Ecological Science Corp., 54 F.R.D. 493, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971i
(defendants could file their answer within ten days of the court's decision on a transfer
motion); United States v. S.S. Claiborne, 226 F. Supp. 578, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
123 Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 677 F. Supp. 198, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Granting the
motion to transfer, the court defers ruling on the motion to dismiss."); McAlister v.
General American Life Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 919, 920 (W.D. Okla. 1980); First Fullen
Commodity Servs, Inc. v. A. G. Becker-Kipnis & Co., 507 F. Supp. 770, 776 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (granting motion to transfer, and declining to rule on several other motions);
Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 106,
106 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (court grants the defendant's motion to transfer, "and does not
reach the question of dismissal").
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A court contemplating a possible transfer typically should not
resolve a host of outstanding issues.'24 The judge receiving a
transferred case might disagree with orders entered by the judge
who has transferred the case. The new judge then would face the
difficult dilemma of applying orders that he believes are incorrect,
or reversing orders entered by another district judge.125 To
avoid such problems, the judge receiving a transferred case
should be allowed to begin with a clean slate. 26
A defendant thus may delay or halt litigation by filing a
transfer motion. The defendant might prevail on the motion, with
the district court transferring the case to the defendant's pre-
ferred forum. But even if the court denies the transfer motion,
the defendant still has achieved a victory by delaying the
plaintiffs suit.'27
Accordingly, courts should expect that defendants will raise
transfer motions whenever an alternative forum arguably could
prove more convenient. Other sources of control must be exam-
ined.
B. The District Courts
The district courts represent another possible source for uni-
form and limiting transfer standards. District judges initially will
decide a section 1404 transfer motion. District courts could deter
Some courts will refuse to freeze other components of litigation while a transfer
motion remains pending. See, e.g., Kron Medical Corp. v. Groth, 119 F.R.D. 636, 638
(M.D.N.C. 1988) ("This general policy disfavoring the staying of discovery applies equally
to cases wherein a motion is made to transfer the case to another district pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).").
124 See, e.g., Donnelly v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 515 F. Supp. 5, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1981); St.
Cyr v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 724, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
125 As illustrated by cases where different courts have entered conflicting transfer
orders, district judges sometimes will refuse to follow a colleague's decision. See text
accompanying notes 202-231 infra.
126 Sie, e.g., Dutchen v. Ecological Science Corp., 54 F.R.D. 493, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(declining to decide class certification motion, since case would be transferred to the
Southern District of Florida).
127 See Green, Juiy Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE LJ. 482, 494 n.36 (1956)
("As a delaying tactic it [the section 1404 motion to transfer] has few equals . .. ");
Kitch, supra note 13, at 139 ("The motion can always be made for purposes of delay,
and even though chances of success are slim, the hope of .obtaining a jury which is
thought likely to be more favorable may spur a flood of objectively superfluous mo-
tions."); Waggoner, supra note 13, at 67.
A -defendant may achieve additional delay, either by moving for reconsideration
where the court has denied a transfer, or by renewing the transfer motion at a later
date. Masington, supra note 28, at 250.
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defendants from filing transfer motions by granting these motions
only in a limited number of carefully-delineated circumstances.
In attempting to deter abuse of pre-trial procedures, the dis-
trict courts increasingly have imposed sanctions pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule 11.1 s The rule authorizes sanctions where a pleading,
motion, or other filing is not "warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law .... ,129 Courts have sanctioned attorneys under
rule 11 for filing frivolous complaints, 130 frivolous motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment, 3' and frivolous dis-
132covery motions.
But courts almost never have imposed rule 11 sanctions for a
frivolous motion to transfer. Because the Supreme Court has
refused to impose significant limitations on the motion to trans-
fer, almost any transfer motion "will be warranted by existing
law,"133 and thus will comply with rule 11. Courts typically have
denied the few rule 11 arguments challenging transfer motions.3
128 Grossberg, Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L REV. 575, 630 (1987) ("Rule 11 . . .
has quite substantially changed the' nature of the courts' perception of their function as
evaluators of lawyering quality . . . . Indeed, it now is commonplace for federal courts
to examine the quality of lawyering before them."); Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to
Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE LJ. 901, 901 (1988) ("Rule 11 is transforming the conduct of
litigation in the federal courts.").
Commentators have reached vastly differing conclusions on the propriety and effec-
tiveness of rule 11 sanctions. Compare Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1013, 1018 (1988) ("Rule 11 should not be repealed. The litigation abuse which necessi-
tated the rule remains with us and requires ongoing remedial measures.") with LaFrance,
Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 331, 344 (1988) (Rule 11
"tends toward closing access to the courts, and directly collides with Congress' will as
expressed over the past fifty years.").
129 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
130 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F.2d 409, 411-14 (9th Cir, 1989); Yosef v.
Passamaquoddy Tribe, 876 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1989); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d
386 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d
1073 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
131 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Sona Distribs., 847 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (11th Cir.
1988).
132 Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 1989);
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Masco Corp. of Indiana, 871 F.2d 626, 630-31 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 237 (1989).
133 FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
134 See, e.g., Leonardo's, Inc. v. Greathall, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 949, 955 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (suggesting that an unsuccessful transfer motion did not justify rule 11 sanctions,
because "one frivolous argument in an otherwise legitimate brief does not violate rule
11"); Cresswell v. Walt Disney Prods., 677 F. Supp. 284, 289 (M.D. Pa. 1987) ("This is
not an appropriate case for sanctions.").
Courts have granted rule 11 sanctions only in unusual transfer contests where a
party has sought to relitigate a previously decided venue question. See, e.g., Hapaniewski
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Nonetheless, district courts might impose significant limita-
tions on transfer motions without resorting to sanctions. District
judges could require defendants seeking a transfer to make a
strong showing as to the convenience of another court.
To date, most district courts have not adopted such a restric-
tive standard limiting section 1404 transfers. District courts might
view such a standard as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
past approval of several section 1404 transfers." 5 But like civil
defendants, district judges also receive a benefit when they grant
a motion to transfer.
Consider the following hypothetical. Judge James Upright is a
federal district judge sitting in the Northern District of California.
Like his brethren, Judge Upright manages a docket crowded by
an increasing number of criminal trials and a tremendous variety
of civil cases. Nonetheless, Judge Upright's c6lendar remains in
reasonably good shape. Judge Upright manages his calendar close-
ly, assists parties attempting to reach a private settlement, and
decides simple motions without drafting a lengthy opinion.
One typical day, the district's random assignment process
directs the civil case of Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp. to Judge
Upright's chambers. Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp. is a securities fraud
class action brought by small investors who had purchased stock
in the Dallas Oil Corporation. The investors allegedly bought the
securities based on a glowing prospectus which predicted a fifty
percent increase in the corporation's annual net earnings. The
predictions contained in the prospectus proved wrong, Dallas Oil
stock plummeted, and stockholders lost most of their investments.
John Smith, who resides in the Northern District of Califor-
nia and who will serve as the representative plaintiff in this class
action, has filed a 100-page, twenty-count complaint. The com-
plaint names thirty different parties as defendants, including an
accounting firm that helped to prepare the allegedly fraudulent
prospectus, a law firm that reviewed the prospectus; several banks
v. City of Chicago Heights, 883 F.2d 576, 580-81 (7th Cir. 1989), ceit. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1116 (1990) (repeated efforts to convince court to transfer suit pursuant to § 1406 justi-
fied sanctions); Naylor v. Lee's Summit Reorganized School Dist. R-7, 703 F. Supp. 803,
820 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (sanctions justified when plaintiffs filed a second transfer motion,
identical to a motion denied "only days before"), rev'd on other grounds, Jenkins v. Mis-
souri 904 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1990).
135 See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
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that extended financing to Dallas Oil, and various individual de-
fendants.
Ten days after John Smith filed his complaint, Judge Upright
holds his first status conference in Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp. Attor-
neys for the defendants represent that they will move to dismiss
several counts alleged in the complaint, but these attorneys agree
that no argument justifies a dismissal of the entire complaint. In
addition, defense attorneys will file third-party complaints against
various other defendants seeking indemnification and contribu-
tion, and alleging claims- of securities fraud. Attorneys for the
third-party defendants will move to dismiss at least some of these
third-party claims.
Exhausted by the prospect of deciding such extensive mo-
tions, Judge Upright wanders to the judicial cafeteria for lunch.
Jim, you've got that Dallas Oil case?," Judge Hull asks Judge
Upright over lunch. "Remember when I had the Norkon Securi-
ties litigation?" chuckles Judge Hull. "For nine months I couldn't
get away from chambers for one day. Better say goodbye to your
family, Jim."
As he walks back to his chambers from lunch, Judge Upright
breathes a deep sigh.
In his chambers, Judge Upright is surprised to find a motion
to transfer, filed jointly by several of the Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp.
defendants. The 20-page motion asserts that Judge Upright should
transfer Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp. to the Northern District of Tex-
as. The motion notes that the corporate headquarters of Dallas
Oil are located in Texas, as are the defendant law firm and sever-
al of the defendant banks. Accordingly, many of the potentially
relevant witnesses and documents also will be found in Texas.
The motion includes statistics showing that district judges in the
Northern District of Texas face less onerous dockets than Judge
Upright faces in the Northern District of California.
The motion concludes by noting that Smith v. Dallas Oil Corp.
probably will constitute a protacted and time-consuming case.
Judge Upright knows that if he denies the motion to transfer, this
case will make a mess of his docket. But if Judge Upright grants
the motion, the case literally will disappear and will become the
responsibility of a district judge in Texas.
The notion that district judges come to work each day with
the goal of dumping as many cases as possible onto the dockets
of their colleagues is inaccurate and unreasonably cynical. On the
other hand, to assert that judges are blind to their docket condi-
[Vol. 66:443
JUSTICE AND TRANSFER MOTIONS
tions in deciding motions to transfer seems equally implausi-
ble.136 Some judges have attempted to transfer cases solely be-
cause of a backlog in their courts."3 ' And district judges often
have transferred cases on their own motion, even though the
defendant initially did not seek a transfer.'3
In short, district judges will receive the benefit of a less
crowded docket when they transfer a case. For this reason, district
courts are unlikely to advocate specific standards limiting the
availability of the section 1404 transfer.
136 See, e.g., Masington, supra note 28, at 250 ("A liberal attitude exists in most
courts with respect to, entertaining motions to transfer.").
137 Circuit court decisions typically have reversed such attempts. Appellate courts
have agreed that docket congestion, in and of itself, does not justify a transfer. In re
Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The law is well established that a federal
court may not order transfer under section 1404(a) merely to service its personal con-
venience."); Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir.), ceri. dis-
missed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956) ("we think it dangerous to suggest that a judge may deny
entrance to his court to a litigant on the ground of his serious burdens"). See also Gates
Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066
(1985) (reversing forum non conveniens dismssal based heavily on the court's docket
congestion).
138 See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1274 (1990); Clopay Corp. v.
Newell Cos., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 733, 737-39 (D. Del. 1981) (parties received adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard before court transferred case on its own motion
from the District of Delaware to the Northern District of Illinois); Hite v. Norwegian
Carribbean Lines, 551 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (court orders parties "to
show cause why the case should not be transferred"). See also Lead Indus. Assoc. v. Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The
broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer
sua sponte .... ").
One possible attack on this argument might note that district judges also could
reduce their workload by freely granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment. But if anything, the Supreme Court has suggested that many lower courts
have proven too hesitant to resolve cases on summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment procedure is. properly regarded
not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole . . ").
But for several reasons, district courts are likely to approach transfer motions dif-
ferently from motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. First, a district
court may grant a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment only in certain
carefully delineated circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. A district
court contemplating a §. 1404 transfer faces no such limitations. Second, a court that
terminates an entire case on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment
may anticipate immediate appellate review of its decision. Meaningful appellate review of
a transfer ruling is unlikely to occur. See supra text accompanying notes 139-77.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a district judge's decision to grant a motion
to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment will have a serious substantive effect.
Simply put, such a decision will end the plaintiff's case. On the other hand, a district
judge can view a transfer order as producing no substantive effect. The court has not
precluded the plaintiff's suit, but instead merely has transferred the suit to another dis-
trict.
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C. The Appeals Courts
The federal appellate courts represent a final possible source
for the development of principled standards governing transfer
motions.1 3 In theory, the circuit courts might constitute a prop-
er source for such standards. In an era in which the volume of
federal court litigation has continued to increase, some commen-
tators have urged that attorneys should look to the federal ap-
peals courts, rather than the United States Supreme Court, for
the development of fair and uniform legal standards.14 °
But section 1404 transfer decisions are perhaps uniquely insu-
lated from any form of appellate review. 41  First, as any first-
year law student may recite, civil litigants typically may appeal as
a matter of right only from a final judgment.142 The Supreme
Court has defined a "final judgment" as a decision "which ends
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment." '43 Of course, a decision either deny-
ing or granting a motion to transfer does not "end the litigation
on the merits" and is not a final judgment.144
The Supreme Court has recognized that under certain very
limited circumstances a party may appeal a non-final interlocutory
order issued by a district court. Under this "collateral order ex-
ception" to the final judgment rule, a party may seek immediate
appellate review only of those interlocutory orders that satisf'
three conditions: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the
disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on
139 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 130.
140 See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 99 (1985) ("It is
essential that the intermediate appellate courts maintain a reasonable quality and unifor-
mity of federal law to minimize the occasions on which the Supreme Court must inter-
vene."); Wasby, Inconsistency in United States Court of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanics for
Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1343-46 (1979); White, A Salute to the Circuits, 28
LOY. L. REv. 669, 670 (1982). See also Marcus, supra note 11, at 677.
141 See Masington, supra note 28, at 254.
142 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522-25
(1988); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431 (1956).
143 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198-201 (1988); Catlin v.
United States,.324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
144 United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Life Assoc. Co., 787 F.2d 438, 439
(8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Howard Elec. & Mechanical Co. v. Frank Briscoe Co., 754
F.2d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1985); Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 826 (5th
Cir. 1972); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3855 at 472-73;
Masington, supra note 28, at 252.
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appeal from a final judgment."'45 The circuit courts have agreed
that transfer orders are not immediately appealable under the
collateral order exception. 146 Appellate panels apparently have
concluded, at least for purposes of the collateral order exception,
that transfer orders may be reviewed effectively after a district
court has entered a final judgment. 47
While in theory a party may challenge a transfer ruling after
a case has ended with a decision on the merits, such an appeal
probably will fail, because the appellant will be unable to demon-
strate that a transfer motion ruling constitutes a reversible er-
ror. 48 Consider a plaintiff who fails to defeat a transfer motion.'
145 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1988). Accord Lauro Lines v.
Chasser, 109 S. Ct. 1976, 1978 (1989). See also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
146 See, e.g., -In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1984), cell. dismissed, 469 U.S.
1185 (1985); D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 401 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
One circuit has suggested, in dicta, that courts might allow immediate appeals of
transfer decisions under the collateral order exception. 'Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v.
Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 952 n.8 (9th Cir. 1968) ("These [Supreme Court] holdings cast
doubt on the rule against the appealability of § 1404(a). and § 1406(a) orders . . .")
This language in Pence has received severe criticism. See, e.g., 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD, & j.
LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.13[6], at 174-75 (2d ed. 1989).
147 Jesko v. United States, 713 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1983); D'Ippolito v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 401 F.2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1968) ("the cited decisions would not preclude
review ... on appeal from a final judgment"). But see Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-
Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (district court's denial of a motion to
transfer, premised on the court's misinterpretation of a forum selection clause, fell with-
in the collateral order exception and could be challenged in an immediate appeal); infra,
text accompanying notes 148-51.
The party resisting immediate appeal of a transfer decision also might argue that
such a decision is "not completely separate from the merits." The Supreme Court has
held that a decision denying a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss does not fall
within the collateral order exception. The Court reasoned that the district court's forum
non conveniens decision was not competely separate from the merits of the underlying
litigation. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527-31 (1988) ("[T]he court must
consider the locus of the alleged culpable conduct, often a disputed issue, and the con-
nection of that conduct to the plaintiff's chosen forum.").
In addition to rulings that fall within the collateral order exception, litigants may
bring immediaie appeals from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dis-
solving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . .. ." 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1) (1988). See generally Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
Some litigants have asserted that transfer decisions constitute orders "granting or refus-
ing an injunction." However, the appellate courts have agreed that a transfer order sim-
ply is not an injunction and is not immediately appealable pursuant to section
1292(a)(1). See, e.g., M. Spiegel & Sons Oil Corp. v. B. P. Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 669, 670
(2d Cir. 1976) ("A ruling on a stay or" transfer motion is not independently appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as a grant or denial of an injunction."); In re Josephson,
218 F.2d 174, 177 (Ist Cir. 1954); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
43, at § 3855, at 475.
148 See e.g., Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp.,
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The parties then litigate the case aggressively, with the court rul-
ing on contested motions, discovery issues, and evidentiary dis-
putes. The trial concludes, and the jury finds in favor of the de-
fendant.
If, at the conclusion of this litigation, the plaintiffs appeal
focuses on the transfer decision, an appellate court might well
view the appeal with skepticism.1 49 In addition, if the case were
transferred from a different circuit, the appellate panel hearing
the post-trial appeal would lack authority to review the decision of
the district judge who transferred the case.150 Not surprisingly,
the circuit courts have stated that a post-trial appeal challenging a
transfer decision is unlikely to succeed.151
A party seeking to challenge an adverse transfer decision thus
may consider two plausible avenues for an immediate appeal.
Neither approach is likely to succeed. First, the party may assert
that the district court should certify an immediate appeal, pursu-
ant to section 1292(b) of the judicial code. 5 2 Such certified ap-
peals are appropriate where an "order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is a substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion," and "an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 153
A district judge is in no way required to certify an appeal under
this statutory provision, but may allow for such an appeal in her
discretion. 154
A party seeking to bring a certified appeal from a transfer
order faces two almost insurmountable problems. First, a district
court is unlikely to find that the challenged transfer decision in-
volves "a controlling question of law," or that "there is a substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion" as to the merits of the
579 F.2d 561, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1978); Marbury-Patillo Constr. Co. v. Bayside Warehouse
Co., 490 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Masington, supra note 28, at 254
("[T]o postpone review of transfer orders is to make them virtually irreversible on ap-
peal.").
149 See Note, supra note 34, at 298.
150 Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1980); Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d
918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc.,
436 F.2d 1180, 1187-88 (7th Cir.), cea . dismissed, 403 U.S. 942 (1971). See also 15 C.
WRIcHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3855, at 473-74.
151 See, e.g., Filmline Prod., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 520 (2d Cir.
1989); Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969). See also
Kitch, supra note 13, at 117.
152 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
153 Id.
154 Id.; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1978).
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transfer order.'55 In almost any conceivable fact situation the
court will find ample precedent supporting a decision either
granting or denying a transfer. 5 Second, the court may be un-
convinced that the delay accompanying an immediate appeal "will
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
157
Rather than allow an appeal and face a possible reversal, a district
court is much more likely simply to deny certification of an ap-
peal from a transfer ruling. 58
If the district court refuses to certify an appeal of a transfer
decision, the party wishing to challenge this decision must apply
for a writ of mandamus to obtain immediate appellate review. A
number of courts have stated that this writ constitutes the pre-
ferred mechanism for reviewing section 1404 decisions,5 9 al-
though some disagreement exists on the propriety of such re-
160view.
155 Masington, supra note 28, at 252.
156 See Note, supra note 34, at 298 ("Interlocutory appeal is generally considered
unavailable to review a section 1404(a) order because seldom, if ever, is a controlling
question presented.").
157 See, e.g, Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1973); Toro
Co. v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1978); Mazzella v. Stineman, 472 F. Supp. 432, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1125, 1129-30 (W.D. Ark. 1973) ("An
immediate appeal from the order refusing to transfer the case would not materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation."). See also Masington, supra note 28, at
255 ("[I]f interlocutory review is permitted, the purpose of § 1404(a) is undermined in
that convenience and justice are not served because of the delay and expense of an
additional appeal."). Cf. Stewart Org. Corp. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988) (district
court certifies its transfer decision for an immediate appeal, pursuant to § 1292(b)).
Even where a district court certifies an appeal pursuant to § 1292(b), the circuit
court possesses discretion to hear or dismiss that appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988);
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1988).
158 See, e.g., Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1125,
1129-30 (W.D. Ark. 1973); State of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 301 F. Supp. 980
(D. Hawaii 1969).
159 See, e.g., Sunshine Beauty Supplies v. United States Dist. Court, 872 F.2d 310, 311
(9th Cir. 1989); Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 869
(2d Cir. 1950).
160 One Supreme Court dissent has described an order transferring a case outside of
a judicial circuit as appropriate for mandamus review. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 264 (1957) (Brennan, J., dissentfing). But another Supreme Court opinion re-
fused to specify whether appellate courts should review transfer decisions on a writ of
mandamus. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 33 (1955).
See Masington, supra note 28, at 253-54 ("[T]his area is one of considerable confu-
sion."); Note, Appealability of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE L.J. 122, 133-
34 (1967) [hereinafter Note, Appealability of 1404(a) Orders]; Note, supra note 34, at 300
("Disregarding the prohibition against piecemeal appeals delays the ultimate termination
of the litigation by permitting lengthy litigation over issues which are not determinative
of the merits, such as place of trial.").
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The circuit courts have reached little agreement on the ap-
propriate standards for mandamus review of a district court
order.61 But all courts agree that a mere showing of error on
the part of a district judge does not justify mandamus review. 62
Instead, the appellant must demonstrate that a transfer decision
was "clearly erroneous as a matter of law,"'163 or must make "a
clear showing of abuse of discretion."164
However, the lack of specific standards governing section
1404 transfers typically will prevent an appellate court from find-
ing that a district judge has abused his discretion. As the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in reviewing a mandamus appeal
from a transfer decision: "The presumption in favor of the district
court judge is heavy. Appellate review is limited because it serves
little purpose to reappraise such an inherently subjective deci-
sion."165 The relatively few appellate court decisions reviewing
motions to transfer on writs of mandamus typically have affirmed
district court decisions in summary opinions. 66
161 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. United States District Court, 790 F.2d 69, 70 (10th
Cir. 1986); Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp., 408 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1969) ("the circuits
are drastically divided on the question"). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CoO-
PER, supra note 43, § 3855, at 481 ("Indeed, the variations among the circuits, and the
changes of view within a particular circuit, are so great that the law on this point must
be examined on a circuit-by-circuit basis."); Kitch, supra note 13, at 110.
162 Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); DeBeers Consol.
Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945); A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster
Brothers, Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1968) (refusing to reverse transfer decision on
mandamus appeal).
163 NBS Imaging Sys. v. United States Dist. Court, 841 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir.
1988). Accord Sypert v. Miner, 266 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832
(1959) ("something more must be shown than an erroncuos decision by the District
Court . . . . [A]n abuse of discretion must clearly appear.").
164 Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 146 (10th Cir. 1967); accord A.
Olinick & Sons v. Dempster, 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Mandamus does not lie
to review mere error in the disposition of § 1404(a) motions, but only to redress a
clearcut abuse of discretion."); see also Note, supra note 34, at 303.
165 Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1079 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); accord Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
553 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Kasey v. Molybdenum
Corp. of America, 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d
329, 331-32 (2d Cir.), ("At best, the judge must guess, and we should accept his guess
unless it is too wild."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
One Eighth Circuit panel stated its disinclination to reverse transfer orders in even
more blunt terms. "This court has never looked with favor on the use by a disappointed
litigant of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to secure interlocutory review of an order
entered pursuant to § 1404(a)." Toro Co. v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977)
(petition for a writ of mandamus denied), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
166 See, e.g., Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d
513, 520 (2d Cir. 1989); Collins v. Straight, Inc., 748 F.2d 916, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1984);
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Appellate courts thus have reversed district court decisions on
a motion to transfer only in extraordinary situations. In re
Scott" ' involved a Tennessee prisoner's suit seeking government
documents under the Freedom of Information Act.16  The plain-
tiff brought suit in a federal court in the District of Columbia,
which possessed venue over such suits under a provision of the
Freedom of Information Act.169
The district court transferred the case to the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia on its own motion, soley because "the very large
number of forma pauperis cases . . . filed [in the District of Co-
lumbia by prisoners impose] a considerable burden on the Judges
of the District Court."' The District of Columbia Circuit Court
reversed the order because "a federal court may not order trans-
fer under section 1404(a) merely to serve its personal conve-
"171nience."
The Ninth Circuit decision in Washington Public Utilities Group
v. United States District Court17 2 involved a much more typical
mandamus review of a transfer decision. This complex securities
fraud action arose out of a bond default by the Washington Pub-
lic Power Supply System.,7' A Western District of Washington
judge had transferred the Washington Public Utilities Group litiga-
tion to the District of Arizona. 174 Parties opposing the transfer
appealed, asserting that the district judge had "ignored the conve-'
nience of the parties and witnesses," and that he made several
other errors in deciding the transfer motion.' 75
In denying the mandamus petition, the Ninth Circuit did not
reach the merits of -the appellants' arguments. Instead, the court
Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Citizens Bank &
Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 367-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979); Texas E.
Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 567-68 (10th
Cir. 1978).
But see General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.) (writ issued,
compelling district court to transfer case from the District of Maryland to the Northern
District of Illinois, where a related case was pending), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967).
167 709 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
168 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
169 Id. at § 552(a)(4)(B).
170 In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Scott v. McCune, C.A.
No. 82-1879 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1983)).
171 Id. at 723.
172 843 -F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1987).
173 Id. at 321.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 323.
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merely held that the parties could challenge the transfer motion
after a final judgment, and that the parties had not demonstrated
that "severe prejudice" would result from the transfer ruling."7 6
District court rulings on motions to transfer are unlikely to
receive the scrutiny of meticulous appellate review. Parties typical-
ly may challenge transfer orders only by seeking a writ of manda-
mus, and must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion. Because
the Supreme Court has authorized the district courts to exercise
broad discretion in resolving transfer motions, appellate courts
will find an abuse of discretion only in the most extraordinary
circumstances. Such limited appellate review of transfer orders has
not and will not produce coherent standards.1 77
D. Problems in Resolving Motions to Transfer
The preceding discussion demonstrates that neither the de-
fendants, the district courts, nor the circuit courts are likely to
develop standards limiting the section 1404 transfer. A continued
lack of such limitations is disturbing, because some transfer deci-
sions raise serious problems. The following discussion identifies
two such problems: (1) transfers to distant districts, which result
in plaintiff prejudice; and (2) multiple transfers of a single case.
1. Transfers to Distant Districts and Plaintiff Prejudice
Courts hearing section 1404 motions typically have stated that
a plaintiffs choice of forum should receive some weight.17 ' De-
spite suggestions that a transfer should not impose a substantial
hardship on the plaintiff, a number of decisions have transferred
cases a great geographic distance. Although Congress adopted
section 1404 in part to prevent plaintiffs from harassing defen-
dants by filing suit in a distant forum, 179 some transfer decisions
176 Id. at 325. See also A. Olnick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 444 (2d
Cir. 1966) ("We do not believe that the District Court so abused its discretion in order-
ing a transfer as to require the issuance of mandamus.").
177 See Stein, supra note 3, at 815, 817, 832 (broad district court discretion precludes
effective appellate review of forum non conveniens decisions).
178 See, e.g., Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970) ("It is black
letter law that a plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is a paramount consideration in
any determination of a transfer request, and that choice . . . should not be lightly dis-
turbed."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365
F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The plaintiffs choice of venue is still entitled to substan-
tial consideration . . . ."). See also infra text accompanying notes 238-255.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 17-46.
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have allowed defendaits to impose the same type of hardship on
the plaintiff.
Section 1404 was used to move litigation from one coast to
another in Lou v. Belzberg.'80 Plaintiff Jacques Lou brought a
shareholders' derivative suit on behalf of Ashland Oil Company
shareholders. Lou's complaint alleged that these shareholders had
suffered injury when members of the Belzberg family first threat-
ened to take over Ashland Oil, but later sold their stock back to
Ashland Oil at a premium price."" The Lou complaint alleged
that the Belzbergs and various other defendants had violated fed-
eral securities fraud statutes, and the federal racketeering stat-
ute.
182
Lou filed her complaint with a California state court in Los
Angeles. The defendants subsequently removed the case from
state court to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.,8 " The defendants then moved for a sec-
tion 1404 transfer of the case to the Southern District of New
York.
In an unpublished opinion, the district court granted the
defendants' transfer motion. 184 In three paragraphs, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed this decision. The appellate panel noted that the
contested repurchase of the Belzbergs' stock was negotiated in
New York, that the majority of potential witnesses resided in the
New York area, and that "the costs of litigation would be drasti-
cally reduced if the case were heard in New York."' 85 The
plaintiff's choice of a California forum was dismissed by the Ninth
Circuit, because "when an individual brings a derivative suit or
represents a class, the named plaintiff's choice of forum is given
less weight." 86
Transfers to a distant forum may prejudice corporate plain-
tiffs as well as individual plaintiffs. In Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Computer
Talk, Inc.,'87 the plaintiff brought a diversity action, alleging that
the defendant had breached a contract by failing to develop, con-
180 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987), cet. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
181 Id. at 732.
182 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
183 Defendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § .1441(a), (c) (1988).
184 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993
(1988).
185 Id.
186 Id. (citations omitted). Cf. note 252 infra (questioning whether court willingness
to transfer class actions and derivative suits is appropriate).
187 605 F. Supp. 717 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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struct, and install a stenciling machine. Plaintiff Letter-Rite, a
small closely-held Illinois corporation, filed suit in the Northern
District of Illinois. Defendant Computer Talk, a small closely-held
Colorado corporation, moved to transfer the case to the District
of Colorado.'
In analyzing this transfer motion, the Northern District of
Illinois court began by noting that "[e]ach side's forum is really
inconvenient for the other."18 9 The court also did not find that
either Illinois or Colorado would be significantly more convenient
for potential witnesses. Nonetheless, the court decided to transfer
the case to the District of Colorado, based on three facts. First,
the defendant's contract performance was to occur in Colorado.
Second, the court held that Illinois law would govern the contro-
versy. Third, the court found that "Uj]udges in this District have a
heavier average caseload than their Colorado counterparts." 90
Transfers to a distant district may prejudice the plaintiff for
at least two reasons. First, a distant trial may be far more expen-
sive for a plaintiff than a trial near the plaintiffs residence.' 9 ' A
plaintiff attending a distant trial must pay his travel and accom-
modation costs. The plaintiff presumably also must pay similar
costs incurred by witnesses traveling to the distant court. Even if
the plaintiff can afford these expenses, convincing witnesses to
appear voluntarily at a distant trial may prove difficult.
192
188 Id. at 719.
189 Id. at 720.
190 Id. at 722. See also Bayless v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y.),
rehearing granted, 702 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (transferring case from the Southern
District of New York to the Southern District of Texas, despite the plaintiffs lack of any
contacts with Texas).
191 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 33 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting). Occa-
sionally, courts will order a transfer only if the defendant agrees to pay some of the
plaintiffs costs of litigating in a foreign district. See, e.g., Semro v. Halstead Enters., Inc.,
619 F. Supp. 682, 684 (N.D. I1. 1985); Masington, supra note 28, at 250 (citing cases).
But most transfer orders do not require such reimbursement. See Kaufman, supra note 6,
at 606 ("[O]ne factor which has not appeared too often in the cases is the ability of the
parties to bear the expense of trial in the transferee forum.").
192 See Masington, supra note 28, at 243.
If a witness is hostile or recalcitrant, the plaintiff may be unable to produce this
witness at trial after a transfer to a distant district. A federal court may issue a subpoe-
na compelling trial attendance only as to persons found either within the state where
the federal court sits, or within 100 miles of the federal district where the case is pend-
ing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1). If a witness is not located within this geographic distance
from the transferee court, a party cannot require that witness to testify at trial. See, e.g.,
Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 179, 182 (D. Nev. 1985);
Kreisner v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 468 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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The problems generated by a distant trial should not be over-
stated, given the small number of federal civil cases that ever
reach trial.' But a transfer typically will require the plaintiff to
retain a new attorney who practices in the transferee district.194
For a plaintiff with little litigation experience, identifying a local
counsel may prove particularly difficult.195
This does not suggest that the federal courts never should
transfer a case. To the contrary, a transfer of litigation away from
the plaintiff's home forum sometimes will appear perfectly appro-
priate. For example, in Balty Manufacturing Corp. v. Kane,9 '
plaintiff Bally Manufacturing Corporation brought a breach of
contract suit, alleging that the individual and corporate defen-
dants had purchased but failed to pay for coin-operated games.
Plaintiff Bally Manufacturing maintained its principal place of
business in Chicago, Illinois, and filed suit in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. The defendants sought a section' 1404 transfer to
the Middle District of Florida.'
9 7
In granting the transfer, the Bally Manufacturing court empha-
sized the hardships that travel from Florida to Illinois would im-
pose on at least one of the individual defendants. The court also
noted: "While [plaintiff] Bally's principal place of business is locat-
ed within this district, Bally obviously does business in Florida
Where a party cannot convince or compel a witness to attend a trial in a distant
court, the party might videotape a deposition of the witness and produce this videotape
as evidence. But such videotaped testimony typically will not prove as effective as in-per-
son testimony at trial. See Wasserman, The Subpoena Powen Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74
MINN. L. REV. 37, 119 (1989).
193 As of June 30, 1988, only about 4.9 percent of all federal cases reached trial.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS 211
(1988) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR].
194 A number of federal districts require that litigants employ local counsel who
practice in the district. See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 2.2.3.3 (party must "designate an attorney
who is a member of the Bar of this Court and who maintains an office within this Dis-
trict as local counsel"); N.D. ILL. R. 3.13(A) (party must designate "a member of the bar
of this Court having an office within this District upon whom service of papers may be
made"); S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. R. 3(a) (judge may require a party to designate "a member
of the bar of either district having an office within either district upon whom service of
papers may be made"); N.D. TEX. R. 13.4 (foreign attorney must "designate as local
counsel a member of the Bar of this Court"). Copies of these local rules are on file
with the author.
195 See Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 773 (3d Cir. 1984) ("In real terms,
transfer of venue to Utah may deprive the plaintiff not only of the forum of his choice,
but also of the attorney of his choice.").
196 698 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
197 Id. at 736.
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and does not deny that it conducts business throughout the Unit-
ed States."'98
Plaintiff Bally Manufacturing's contacts with Florida distin-
guish this decision from the transfers granted in cases such as
Lou v. Belzberg and Letter-Rite, Inc. v. ComputerTalk, Inc., where the
plaintiffs apparently possessed no contacts with the transferee
forum. A plaintiff probably will suffer little hardship if a court
transfers the plaintiffs case to a district where the plaintiff al-
ready conducts business. Particularly if the case arises out of an
incident occurring in the transferee district, some of the plaintiffs
witnesses probably will reside near the transferee court. The plain-
tiff also may have some familiarity with local counsel, through
experience in prior litigation.
On the other hand, a transfer to a distant forum may result
in severe prejudice to a plaintiff, where the plaintiff lacks any con-
tacts with the district receiving the transferred case. In cases such
as Lou and Letter-Rite, courts nonetheless have transferred litiga-
tion to distant districts, notwithstanding a lack of plaintiff contacts
with the transferee forum. These cases suggest that the analysis
used to decide transfer motions needs rethinking.
2. The Civil Case as a Ping-Pong Ball: Multiple Transfers
In a number of cases, courts have granted multiple motions
to transfer. 9 In other words, a court receiving a transferred
case subsequently may return the case to the district where the
plaintiff originally filed suit, or may send the case to a third dis-
trict. Where courts grant such multiple transfers, litigation may
take on the appearance of a judicial ping-pong game, with a case
bounced back and forth between courts without any resolution of
substantive issues.200
Some transferee courts have have returned a case to the
court issuing a transfer order, asserting that the transferee court
lacked personal jurisdiction or was an improper venue for the
suit.2"' In Hite v. Norwegian Caribbean Lines, °2 the plaintiff
198 Id. at 738.
199 See Masington, supra note 28, at 250.
200 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the propriety of multiple
transfers, some court decisions appear to authorize such orders. See Koehring v. Hyde
Co., 382 U.S. 362, 365 (1966) (parties may apply "to have the case transferred back to
the Southern District of Mississippi because of changed conditions"); Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335 (1960) (returning transferred case from the Northern District of Illinois to
the Northern District of Texas).
201 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960) (court may transfer a case
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sought to recover for personal injuries he had sustained aboard a
cruise ship operated by the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit in
the Michigan state courts, but the defendants removed the case to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan.
The district court, on its own motion, transferred the case to
the Western District of Michigan."' The district judge conclud-
ed that the Eastern District of Michigan was not a proper venue
for the suit, but that the Western District of Michigan would rep-
resent a proper venue.0 4
About two months after receiving the Hie case, the United
States Court for the Western District of Michigan entered a sec-
ond transfer order, returning the case to the Eastern District of
Michigan. 0 5 In ordering this second transfer, Judge Enslen of
the Western District of Michigan entered findings of fact that con-
tradicted the prior Eastern District of Michigan holding. Specifical-
ly, Judge Enslen found that the. Eastern District of Michigan was a
proper venue for the Hite suit, but that the Western District of
Michigan was not a proper venue.
20 6
After receiving the Hite .case back from the Western District
of Michigan, the Eastern District of Michigan court did not move
on to the substantive aspects of the litigation, but once again
considered the venue issue. The Eastern District court remained
unpersuaded that its earlier venue ruling was in error.20 7 The
court thus transferred the Hite case for the third time, returning
the litigation to the Western District of Michigan. 0 8
only to a district where the suit "might have been brought"). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3846, at 361-62 ("A motion to retransfer is per-
fectly appropriate on a showing of changed circumstances.").
202 551 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
203 Id. at 392. The plaintiff asserted that the case should remain in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan. The defendant argued that if the court did enter an transfer order,
the court should transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida. Id.
204 Id. at 395.
205 Id. at 392.
206 Id. at 395.
207 Id. at 394-95.
208 Id. at 393-97. Prior to again transferring the case, the Eastern District of Michi-
gan court established a 15-day interim period, during which either party could seek to
set aside the third transfer order through a writ of mandamus issued by the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 397.
See also Bashir v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 508 F. Supp. 1108, 1113-14 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(case returned from the Eastern District of Virginia to the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania); Rixner v. White, 417 F. Supp. 995 (D.N.D. 1976) (North Dakota court, which had
received a transferred case from a Missouri court, in turn transferred the case to the
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In other cases where litigation in the transferee court would
not raise personal jurisdiction or venue problems, a transferee
court nonetheless has transferred the case for a second or third
time."' In Fluor Corp. v. Pullman, Inc.,21 the plaintiff filed an-
titrust and patent litigation in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California. On the defendant's section 1404
motion, the Calif6rnia court transferred this case to the Western
District of Oklahoma.
211
After the Fluor suit arrived in Oklahoma, the defendant
moved for a second transfer of the case to Georgia. In support of
this section 1404 motion, the defendant asserted that subsequent-
ly-filed and related litigation was pending in the Southern District
of Georgia. The, United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma granted this second transfer motion, because
"it would be more convenient for Defendant to try the instant
case with the consolidated cases now pending before the Georgia
Court rather than having separate trials.
'2 12
Multiple transfers raise a number of conceptual and practical
problems. First, when a district court receiving a transferred case
decides to send that litigation elsewhere, the court in effect is
reversing the district court that had entered the first transfer or-
der. For a court to enter a second transfer order, the court must
determine that it is not a convenient forum for the litigation, con-
trary to the conclusion of the court that first transferred the liti-
gation.
It is highly questionable whether district judges should exer-
cise such appellate review of decisions by other district courts. 3
District of Minnesota); Ferri v. United Aircraft Corp., 357 F. Supp. 814, 815-16 (D.
Conn. 1973) (returning case to the Southern District of Florida); Watwood v. Barber, 70
F.R.D. 1, 9 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (returning case to the Southern District of Alabama).
209 See Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 382 U.S, 362, 365 (1966); In re Cragar
Indus., 706 F.2d 503, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1983); Russell v. IU Int'l, 685 F. Supp. 172, 176
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Holszager v. Valley Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), But
see Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 692 F.
Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Minn. 1988) (refusing to return case to the Eastern District of
Michigan, although a Minnesota district judge had declined to consolidate the suit with
an allegedly related action).
210 446 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
211 Id. at 778.
212 Id. See also Union Tank Leasehold Building Co. v. Dupont Clore Forgan, Inc.,
494 F. Supp. 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (returning case to the Northern District of Illi-
nois, after the plaintiffs had dropped allegations that were similar to the claims asserted
in a Southern District of New York case); Ferri v. United States Dep't of Justice, 441 F.
Supp. 404 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (returning Freedom of Information Act suit to a District of
Columbia federal court).
213 See generally Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816
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Appellate review in the federal courts typically is exercised by
three-judge circuit court panels, not by individual district judges.
Individual district judges perform an appellate function only in a
few situations, which include reviewing the decisions of a bank-
ruptcy judge214 or the report and recommendations of a magis-
trate. 2 15 District judges may lack sufficient appellate experience
or authority to evaluate the section 1404 determinations of other
district judges. 16
Multiple transfers also may violate the policy preserving the
finality of judicial decisions. As stated in a frequently quoted Su-
preme Court passage, this policy of finality "has the dual purpose
of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical
issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation. 21 7
The principles of res judicata do not preclude reconsideration
of a transfer decision because a court's transfer ruling is not a
final decision on the merits of a case.21 ' However, a transfer de-
cision can bind a judge receiving the transferred case under the
more flexible "law of the case" rules. 9 Law of the case rules
require that a court's interlocutory orders continue to govern
litigation, even when those orders are of questionable validi-
ty. 220
Immunizing a court order from subsequent or collateral at-
tack preserves the integrity of the judiciary by preventing inconsis-
(1988); Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982).
214 See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
215 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 73(d), 74-76.
216 See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 1982); cf,
Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Trnsfened Cases and in
Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 648 (1987).
I A better approach would limit reconsideration of a transfer order to direct appel-
late review. A writ of mandamus may allow for immediate appellate review of a transfer
decision. See supra text accompanying notes 156-76.
217 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
218 Hoffman v. Blaksi, 363 U.S. 335, 341 n.9 (1960); Buhl v. Jeffers, 435 F. Supp.
1149, 1151-52 (M.D. Pa. 1977); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43,
§ 3846, at 359. But cf. Masington, supra note 28, at 257 ("res judicata should apply as
between the circuits on issues of fact and law raised on motions to transfer").
219 See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 408 U.S. 800, 815 (1988);
Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 165-68 (3d Cir. 1982); J. MOORE,
supra note 20, at 210-11 ("[I]f the motion to transfer is granted and the case is trans-
ferred to another district, this latter district should accept the ruling as the. law of the
case for it, and there should be no further transfer except under the most impelling
and unusual circumstances.").
220 Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (dictum). See generally Steinman,
supra note 216, at 597-613.
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tent rulings on the same controversy.221  The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has written that a transferee couft's holding that
the transferror court should not have sent litigation elsewhere is
just such an inconsistent ruling.222 The integrity of the judiciary
is not enhanced when judges in the Eastern and Western Districts
of Michigan send a case back and forth because of a venue dis-
agreement.223 Nor does respect for the federal judicial system
increase when courts shuffle a case from California to Oklahoma
to Georgia, rather than moving forward on substantive issues.224
Criticism of multiple motions to transfer is not limited to
abstract conceptions concerning the lack of appellate authority
possessed by district judges, or the principle of judicial finality.
The most convincing criticism is that multiple transfer decisions
are counterproductive and unfair to the parties. In a system
where both judges and practitioners complain of backlogged dock-
ets and long delays,225 courts should not rehash the question of
which forum is most convenient.226 Repeated considerations of
motions to transfer result in excessive attorney's fees. Each time a
case moves to a new district, the parties are required either by a
local rule or by practical necessity to hire new local counsel, who
require payment for time spent learning about the case.22' And
each time a court entertains a section 1404 motion, parties again
must pay attorneys to brief the transfer issue.
The plaintiff who lacks strong feelings about where her case
should be adjudicated and primarily seeks a quick resolution of
221 Steinman, supra note 216, at 604-05 ("[I]nconsistency and vacilation in decisions
undermine public confidence in the judiciary as a whole, thus lessening respect for and
obedience of the law.").
222 Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982) (New Jersey
federal court receiving a transferred case should not return the case to the District of
Columbia). The Hayman Cash Register decision did not involve a transfer under § 1404.
Instead, the Hayman Cash Register suit was transferred pursuant to a related provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1406 (1988). See supra note 8 (discussing the relationship between § 1404 and §
1406). See also United States v. Koenig, 290 F.2d 166, 173 n.11 (5th Cir. 1961) (dictum).
223 Hite v. Norweigian Caribbean Lines, 551 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
224 Compare Steinman, supra note 216, at 650 ("Insofar as a section 1404 transfer
decision is discretionary, the better rule is for transferee courts to refuse reconsideration
of the transfer order unless they believe that an error of a clear abuse of discretion has
been committed) with Marcus, supra note 11, at 702 ("If a federal court simply accepts
the interpretation of another circuit without addressing the merits, it is not doing its
job.").
225 On the increase in federal court filings and the consequences of congested court
dockets, see generally R. POSNER, supra note 143, at 59-129; Bork, Dealing With the Over-
load in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976).
226 Masington, supra note 28, at 256.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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substantive issues may be offended by the repeated transfer of the
case. In fact, the plaintiff may view the courts as entirely unre-
sponsive, as judges shuffle her case from district to district, in an
apparent attempt to avoid addressing the plaintiff's substantive
claims.
228
Courts that consider ordering the second or third transfer of
case should recall that section 1404 authorizes a transfer "[flor
the convenience of parties and witnesses." 229 The drafters of this
section could not have contemplated that section 1404 would
result in the strange reality of multiple transfers.
3. Summary: The Problems of an Unlimited Transfer Motion
The Supreme Court has asserted that transfer motions are
best left to the discretion of the lower courts. This assertion has
proven incorrect. Civil defendants, the district courts, and the
appellate courts have not provided any meaningful standards to
govern the section 1404 transfer. As a result, courts have ordered
.improvident transfers. Courts have transferred cases to distant
districts with which the plaintiff lacks any contact, and have or-
dered multiple transfers of the same case. The conflicting deci-
sions reached by different courts on the transfer of a single case
illustrate the limits of current section 1404 analysis.30
Given the unfortunate results of some section 1404 transfers,
the next Part of this Article reviews the factors that courts have
considered in deciding transfer motions. Part III concludes that
several of these factors actually demonstrate little about the conve-
nience of different courts.
228 Hite v. Norwegian Carribean Lines, 551 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(court, rather than one of the parties, initially suggested a transfer of the action); Fluor
Corp. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 777, 778 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (the plaintiffs, who
initially had filed their case in the Central District of California, consistently requested
that their case proceed in that district).
One court issuing a third transfer order apologized for "the delay experienced by
the parties to this action." Hite v. Norwegian Carribean Lines, 551 F. Supp. 390, 395
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
229 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
230 On some problems raised by tincontrolled district court discretion, see generally
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY LJ. 748, 756-58 (1982).
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III. THE CURRENT METHOD FOR RESOLVING MOTIONS TO
TRANSFER
Following the approach developed in Supreme Court deci-
sions such as Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert23' district courts have de-
cided section 1404 motions to transfer by balancing a number of
factors on a case-by-case basis.232 One court has suggested that
as many as twenty different factors are relevant when considering
a transfer motion.23 Although the lower courts have used a sim-
ilar method to decide transfer motions, they have disagreed on
which factors are relevant, and on the importance of particular
factors. 34
As many courts have held, the location of witnesses and doc-
uments is important in determining the most convenient forum.
Conducting litigation in a court located near relevant witnesses
and documents will result in benefits during discovery and at
trial.23 5 Courts also have looked to a number of other factors in
deciding transfer motions. This Part evaluates four factors given
considerable weight by most courts: (1) the plaintiffs suit in his
home forum; (2) the applicable law; (3) docket congestion; and
(4) the pendency of a related case. This Part concludes that none
of these factors should have any significant effect on a transfer
decision.
A. The Plaintiff's Suit in His Home Forum
The vast majority of courts have agreed that a plaintiff's
choice of forum should receive some deference, and that this
initial choice of forum always weighs against a transfer.23 6 Be-
231 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
233 Eastern Scientific Marketing, Inc. v. Tekna-Seal, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 173, 180 n.13
(E.D. Va. 1988). See also Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Trunsfer
Under Forum Non Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R. FED.
15, 37-38 (listing 16 factors relevant to a transfer motion).
234 See, e.g., Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. Schoen, 661 F. Supp. 39, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(listing seven factors relevant to a transfer decision); Houk v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 613
F.- Supp. 923, 927 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (in determining whether to transfer a case, "the
court may consider a myriad of factors"); Kitch, supra note 13, at 131 ("District court
opinions on these issues are published in great number, suggesting that the district judg-
es find them difficult to deal with."); Masington, supra note 28, at 241-42.
235 See infra text accompanying notes 334-339.
236 See, e.g., Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The plaintiff's
choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by other consid-
erations."); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364,
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yond this general proposition, however, courts have agreed on
little with respect to importance of the plaintiff's forum choice.
As one leading treatise states: "The courts have developed a bewil-
dering variety of formulations on how much weight is to be given
to plaintiffs choice of forum."
23 7
At one extreme, some cases have freely granted transfer mo-
tions even when the plaintiff has brought suit in his district of
residence, or "home forum." This article already has discussed
some of these decisions.23 8 Other examples are not hard to find.
In Neff Athletic Lettering Co. v. Walters,239 plaintiff Neff Ath-
letic Lettering Company brought a breach of contract suit against
a former company salesman, James Walters. Neff Athletic Letter-
ing filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio, where the com-
pany "resided. ' 24" Even though Ohio law would apply to the
suit and the plaintiff's witnesses were located in 'Ohio, 241 the
Ohio court transferred the Neff case to the District of New Hamp-
shire. The court ordered a transfer because the defendant's poten-
tial witnesses were located in "the eastern United States '"242 the
defendant had stored .his business records in New Hampshire,
and the New Hampshire federal court's docket was less crowded
than the Ohio court's docket.243
At the other extreme, some courts have held that a plaintiff's
choice of forum should receive great deference, regardless of the
plaintiffs connection to the forum state. In Babbidge v. Apex Oil
Co., 244 a seaman who had suffered personal injury aboard the
S/T St. Emillion brought suit against three defendant corpora-
tions that, owned and operated the ship. All of the defendants
368 (7th Cir. 1979).
237 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3848, at 375.
238 See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987); Letter-Rite, Inc. v. Com-
puter Talk, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 717, 719-22 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
239 524 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
240 Id. at 271.
'241 Id. at 273.
242 Id. at 274.
243 Id. See also Anderson v. Thompson, 634 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (D. Mont. 1986)
(transferring suit from Montana to the Eastern District of Washington, where the "over-
whelming majority of plaintiffs are Montana residents"); Windmere Corp. v. Remington
Products, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (transferring suit brought in Florida by
Florida corporation to the District of Connecticut); Environmental Services, Inc. v. Bell
Lumber & Pole Co., 607 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (even though Illinois corporation
with its principal place of business in Chicago brought suit in the Northern District of
Illinois, court transfers the case to the District of Minnesota).
244 676 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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were Missouri corporations. The plaintiff, a Maine resident,
brought suit in the Southern District of New York.245
The Babbidge court denied the defendants' motion to transfer
the case to the District of Maine. The district court noted that
both the plaintiff and his physicians resided in Maine.246 None-
theless, the court held that the Southern District of New York was
a convenient forum, noting that the plaintiffs former vessel had
docked at New York six times during the past year.247 The
Babbidge court further stated: "Even assuming, however, that none
of the parties has any significant contacts with New York,
plaintiff's choice is still entitled to some deference."
248
Most courts have settled on a compromise between the ex-
treme view that the plaintiffs choice of forum should never be
disturbed, and the equally extreme view that the plaintiff's choice
of forum is of no importance. This majority view holds that when
a plaintiff brings suit within his "home state," meaning his state
of domicile or residence, a court should not transfer the case.
249
But when the plaintiff brings suit outside his state of domicile or
residence, this choice of forum will receive little deference, and a
court should transfer the case if another forum appears more
convenient."'
245 Id. at 519.
246 Id. at 520.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 519. See also Ayers v. Arabian American Oil Co., 571 F. Supp. 707, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying motion to transfer suit brought by Ohio residents in the
Southern District of New York); Lee v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 445 F. Supp. 189,
195 (D. Del. 1978) (refusing to transfer case, even though the district where the plaintiff
filed suit "is not his 'home turf").
249 See, e.g., Zangiacomi v. Saunders, 714 F. Supp. 658, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("There
is a strong presumption in favor of the residents-plaintiffs original choice of forum.");
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Stanley, 585 F. Supp. 610,
612 (N.D. IIl. 1984) (refusing to transfer suit brought in Illinois by bank with its princi-
pal place of business in Illinois); American Argo v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty,
590 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[W]here, as here, the plaintiff files suit in his
home forum, that choice is entitled to considerable deference."); Kitch, supra note 13, at
135 ("Generally, if the plaintiff is a resident of the forum or if some of his important
witnesses reside there, his choice of venue will not be disturbed."). See also Marcus, supra
note 11, at 697.
250 See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299,
304 (7tl Cir. 1955); CES Publishing Corp. v. Dealerscope, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 656, 662
(E.D. Pa. 1982) ("plaintiffs choice is entitled to less weight where, as here, plaintiff is
not a resident of the forum and the cause of action did not arise here"). See also Gener-
al Instrument Corp. v. Mostek Corp., 417 F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (D. Del. 1976).
Courts also have found that the plaintiffs choice of forum should receive little
deference where the plaintiff brings suit in a representative capacity, as in the case of a
class action or a shareholders' derivative suit. See, e.g., Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730,
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This distinction, based on whether 'the plaintiff has brought
suit in his state of residence, has prima facie intuitive appeal.
Where a plaintiff has brought suit in his state of residence or
domicile, a court may assume that considerations of convenience
truly have motivated this choice of forum. If nothing else, a plain-
tiff suing in his state of residence will have a short trip from his
home (or from the home office) to the courthouse.
On the other hand, courts have assumed that a plaintiff filing
suit ina forum far from his residence did not choose the distant
forum for reasons of convenience. Instead, courts often have sug-
gested that a plaintiff's decision to file suit in a distant forum
represents an exercise in abhorrent "forum shopping," designed
solely to gain advantage of some procedural or substantive idio-
syncrasy.51
But the plaintiffs choice of forum may result more from the
geographic location of the defendant than from a preconceived
litigation strategy. A plaintiff has no absolute right to bring a suit
in his state of residence, despite the suggestion of some transfer
decisions to the contrary. Instead, the plaintiff may bring suit in
his state of residence or domicile only where that forum possesses
personal jurisdiction over the defendant and constitutes a proper
venue.
The heavy emphasis on whether the plaintiff hai filed suit in
his state of residence. may produce arbitrary results. Consider two
739 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming transfer of plaintiff's class action and shareholders' deriva-
tive suit); Supco Automotive Parts v. Triangle Auto Spring Co., 538 F. Supp. 1187, 1192
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (transferring class action); Stoltz v. Baker, 466 F. Supp. 24, 27 (M.D.N.C.
1978) (transferring shareholders' derivative suit). Courts have reasoned that because a
large class action or derivative suit will include class members living throughout the Unit-
ed States, the domicile of the individual class represenative is of limited importance in
determining the most convenient forum for the suit. See, e.g., Impervious Paint Indus-
tries, Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Silverman v. Wel-
lington Management Co., 298 F. Supp. 877, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
This reasoning conflicts with the rule that a representative plaintiff owes a special
duty to prosecute a suit effectively on behalf of absent class members. See, e.g., Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); Hassine v. Jeffers, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)
(named plaintiff must possess "the ability and the incentive to represent the claims of
the class vigorously"); Sharif v. New York State Education Department, 127 F.R.D. 84, 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court must inquire whether class representatives "are able to act as fi-
duciaries in protecting the interests of the class"). See also National Super Spuds v. New
York Mercantile Exchange, 425 F. Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Plaintiff's choice of
forum is significant in a class action where it appears preferable to other forums in
administering the action and protecting the class.").
251 See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir.
1967); Schmid Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 654 F. Supp.
734, 736-37 (D.D.C. 1986); Waggoner, supra note 13, at 81.
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hypothetical plaintiffs, Arthur Adams and Benjamin Bernard. Both
Adams and Bernard live in Pittsburgh, Pennslvania. At about the
same time, Adams and Bernard each sought to purchase
"beachfront" Florida property for a retirement home. The two
plots of Florida land purchased by Adams and Bernard turn out
to be below the tideline, and are not suitable for any residential
use. Both Adams and Bernard plan to sue the realtors who sold
the properties for breach of contract and fraud.
In deciding to purchase his worthless Florida property, Ad-
ams dealt with the Tidewater Property Corporation. Tidewater
Property is a Florida corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Miami, Florida. Tidewater Property Corporation maintains
a permanent sales office in Pittsburgh, Pennslyvania.
Adams wishes to bring a federal court suit against Tidewater
Property in Adams' district of residence, the Western District of
Pennsylvania. Because Tidewater Property maintains a permanent
sales office in Pittsburgh, Tidewater Property possesses minimum
contacts with the State of Pennsylvania, and the federal court in
the Western District of Pennsylvania may exercise personal juris-
diction over Tidewater Property.2 2 Adams may bring suit in the
Western District of Pennsylvariia.
Bernard dealt with the Sandpiper Property Corporation. Like
Tidewater Property, Sandpiper Property is a Florida corporation
with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. However,
unlike Tidewater Property, Sandpiper Property maintains no office
in Pittsburgh. The Sandpiper Property office nearest to Bernard's
home is located in Cleveland, Ohio. Because Sandpiper Property
does not possess minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, a Western
District of Pennsylvania court will lack personal jurisdiction over
Sandpiper Property. 23 Bernard must bring suit in the Northern
District of Ohio, or in Florida.
252 Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277, 1288 (W.D.
Pa. 1983) (court could assert personal jurisdiction over a British Virgin Islands corpora-
tion, which maintained an office in the Western District of Pennsylvania).
253 Johnson v. Summa Construction, 632 F. Supp. 122, 126 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania was not established by "[t]he maintenance of a toll-free num-
ber, the presence of brochures in one travel agency with no information about commis-
sions or referrals, and a single mailing"); Bucks County Playhouse v. Bradshaw, 577 F.
Supp. 1203, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (a series of telephone calls, a mailing, and a telegraph
sent to Pennsylvania were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania);
George Trans. & Rigging Co. v. International Publications Equip. Corp., 425 F. Supp.
1351, 1354-55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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Although these two suits are virtually identical, Adams and
Bernard might receive very different rulings if.a defendant seeks
a section 1404 transfer to a federal court in Miami, Florida. Most
district courts probably would refuse to -transfer Adams' suit to
the Southern District of Florida. Plaintiff Adams has brought suit
in his state of residence, and the court probably would give defer-
ence to this choice of forum.
On the other hand, a court might well grant a Sandpiper
Property motion to transfer a suit filed by Bernard from the
Northern District of Ohio to Miami. Bernard has not brought suit
in his state of residence, and thus his choice of a Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio court probably 'would receive little deference. If
Sandpiper Property shows that many of its witnesses and docu-
ments are located in Florida and that the Florida courts are not
overburdened, Sandpiper Property might wall succeed in transfer-
ring Bernard's suit to Florida.
These divergent results seem unfair. Adams could bring suit
in the Western. District of Pennsylvania only because- of the fortu-
itous fact that Tidewater Property maintanined an office in Penn-
sylvania. Bernard could not bring suit in his state of residence
because Sandpiper Property did not possess minimum contacts
with the state. Bernard was no more engaged in "forum shop-
ping" than Adams, and y~t a court might transfer Bernard's suit
to a distant district.
Not only may this focus on the plaintiff's home forum cause
a court to order improvident transfers, this focus also might cause
a court to deny meritorious transfer motions. Assume that instead
of defending a suit brought by Adams, Tidewater Property must
defend against a fraud suit brought by the National Trucking
Corporation. National Trucking sought to purchase Florida prop-
erty for an office complex, and dealt with Tidewater Property.
Like Adams, National Trucking is a Pennsylvania domiciliary.
National Trucking is incorporated in Pennsylvania, and maintains
its principal place of business in the state. Also like Adams, Na-
tional Trucking files suit against Tidewater Property in the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania:
But unlike Adams, National Trucking possesses extensive
contacts with the State of Florida. Perhaps National Trucking
maintains a permanent office in Miami. The National Trucking
employees who negotiated the Florida land contract, and who
would testify against Tidewater Property at a trial, work at this
Florida office. All of National Trucking's relevant documents also
1990]
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are located in Florida. Litigation of the National Trucking suit
thus could prove more convenient in Florida, and a transfer to
Florida would not prejudice plaintiff National Trucking. Nonethe-
less, a court might decline to transfer this case, because National
Trucking has filed suit in its "home forum."
A focus on whether a plaintiff has brought suit in his home
forum thus appears inappropriate. This focus neither provides a
plaintiff with adequate protection against the hardship of an inap-
propriate transfer, nor insures that litigation will occur in the
most convenient court.
B. The Applicable Law
Many decisions have viewed the applicable state law as rele-
vant to a transfer motion.254 If the substantive law of a foreign
state governs a case, a court should consider transferring the case
to a district court that sits in that foreign state.255 On the other
hand, if the substantive law of the state where the plaintiff has
filed suit applies, a district court should hesitate to order a
transfer. 
2 5 6
For example, in Vaughn v. American Basketball Association,5 7
professional basketball player David Vaughn, Jr. brought suit
against his former employer, the Virginia Squires Basketball Club
of the American Basketball Association. Vaughn alleged that the
Virginia Squires had failed to make salary payments required
under Vaughn's $1.2 million employment* contract.
254 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645 (1964); Kitch, supra note 13, at 133.
See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). This factor is relevant only
if a complaint alleges substantive state law claims. All federal courts are equally compe-
tent to interpret the United States Constitution and federal statutes. 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 43, § 3854, at 469.
255 See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645 (1964) (reversing circuit court's
refusal to transfer cases from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the District of Mas-
sachusetts); Security Say. Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 350, 354
(D.NJ. 1989) (finding the applicability of Minnesota law "to strongly weigh in favor of
transfer"); Wallen v. Loving, 609 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (transferring case to
Colorado, where suit "may involve a question of Colorado law").
256 Prudential Ins. Co. v. BMC Indus., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 652, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(declining to transfer case from the Southern District of New York to the District of
Minnesota, where New York law applied); Omni Exploration, Inc. v. Graham Eng'g
Corp., 562 F. Supp. 449, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (court would not transfer case to Texas,
where Pennsylvania law applied); Ronco, Inc. v. Plastics, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 391, 402
(N.D. I11. 1982) (court would not transfer case to Texas, in part because Illinois law
applied to the suit).
257 419 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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The Virginia Squires responded that Vaughn himself had
breached the employment contract. Police had arrested Vaughn
after an auto chase, resulting in Vaughn's injury from police gun-
fire.258 Vaughn's conduct allegedly breached a clause in his em-
ployment contract, requiring that Vaughn "conduct himself in ac-
cordance with the highest standards of morality." '259
A Southern District of New York decision transferred
Vaughn's suit to the Eastern District of Virginia. In support of
this decision, the Vaughn court noted that Virginia law would
apply to the employment contract, and that a Virginia federal
judge should feel comfortable interpreting this law."' In deter-
mining whether Vaughn had failed to act within "the highest stan-
dards of morality," and thus had breached the contract, the
Vaughn court stated that "a sensitivity not- only to Virginia law,
but to Virginia mores and customs might be a particularly valu-
able asset." '261
Like all section 1404 factors, courts have disagreed on the
importance of the applicable law. A number of opinions have
denied section 1404 transfers, even though the law of a foreign
state would govern the case.262
Determining transfer motions based on the applicable law
seems plausible at first glance. District judges are presumed to be
more familiar with the law of the state where they sit than with
the law of foreign states. For this reason, so, the argument goes, a
case requiring the application of a particular state's law should
proceed before a federal judge sitting in that state.265
258 Id. at 1275.
259 Id. at 1276.
260 Id. at 1278.
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., Turrett Steel Corp. v. Manuel Int'l, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 387, 390 (W.D.
Pa. 1985) ("District courts regularly apply, law of states other than the forum state.");
Vassallo v. Niedermeyer, 495 F. Supp. 757, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The fact that the law
of another jurisdiction governs the outcome of the case is a factor to be accorded little
weight on a motion to transfer . . . ."); Lee v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp.
189, 195 (D. Del. 1978) ("probable application of Maryland law" was not "a decisive
factor requiring transfer"). . I
263 Kyle v. Days Inn- of America, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 368, 370 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ("a
federal court sitting in Georgia would be better prepared to fairly consider the nuances
of Georgia tort law"); Higgins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp.
984, 987 (D.D.C. 1981) (transferring case to the Eastern District of Virginia, *where the
case raised "the issue of the plaintiff's capacity to bring suit under Virginia law, a ques-
tion which a court sitting in Virginia is much better able to resolve").
Compare Coface v. Optique Du Monde, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 500, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(court transfers case governed by New York law from New York to Illinois, writing that
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But this seemingly plausible reasoning is actually of question-
able validity. First, it is not clear that a federal district judge will
possess much greater familiarity with the law of the state where
she sits than with the law of a foreign state. Of course, a Texas
district judge, who had practiced as a personal injury litigator in
the state for twenty years before her appointment to the bench,
will be more familiar with Texas tort law than a federal district
judge in New York or California.
But federal district judges by no means are drawn exclusively
from private practice. Recent federal district appointments have
come from federal enforcement agencies, state administrative
departments, or law school faculties." 4 Such individuals are un-
likely to possess any special experience with a particular body of
state law.
One might assert that even if a new federal district judge
does not possess extensive experience with the law of the state
where she sits, she will learn this law through hearing cases on
the bench. This assumption also seems highly questionable.
In 1988, only about twenty-nine percent of the cases filed in
the federal courts were diversity jurisdiction suits, in which ad-
verse parties residing in different states contested state law
claims.265 Federal district judges will learn little about substan-
tive state law when hearing suits brought under the United States
Constitution or a federal statute.266 Even where parties assert
substantive state law claims, a federal court may need to apply the
"the Illinois federal court undoubtedly has sufficient access to New York legal materi-
als").
264 Consider a few relatively recent appointments to the federal district courts. For
ten years before his appointment to the Northern District of Illinois, the Hon. James B.
Zagel had worked in various state agencies, including the Illinois Department of State
Police. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments, Part I, Before the Senate Judiciay
Committee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1987). The Hon. Wayne E. Alley had served as a
Military Judge and as the Dean of the University of Oklahoma College of Law before
his 1985 appointment to the Western District of Oklahoma. W. DORNETrE & R. CROSS,
FEDERAL JUDICIARY ALMANAC 805 (1987). Before his appointment to the District of Co-
lumbia District Court, The Hon. Stanley Sporkin had held positions with several federal
administrative agencies, and had served as General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Id. at 309-10.
265 Of the 239,634 cases filed in the federal courts in 1988, 68,224 were based on
diversity jurisdiction. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 193, at 180. Federal
courts also possess jurisdiction over cases where the United States is a plaintiff or a
defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1346 (1988). Some of these cases involve claims based
on substantive state law. But see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943) (federal law, rather than state law, governed suit brought by the United States to
recover payment on a forged check).
266 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (providing for federal question jurisdiction).
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law of a foreign state, rather than the law of the state where the
federal court sits.26 v And if the substantive law of the state
where the federal district court sits is applicable, a federal judge
will not apply this law if a case is resolved on a procedural issue,
such as a personal jurisdiction or improper venue argument.26
But even assuming each federal district judge possessed an
expert's knowledge of the civil law in ,the state where he sat,
transfer of a case still might complicate, rather than simplify, the
application of state law.269 Under a rule promulgated by the Su-
preme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack,210 "the transferee district
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have
been applied if there had been no change-of venue."271
This rule was adopted to prevent defendants from u~ing sec-
tion 1404 in aid of forum shopping. The Van Dusen Court ex-
pressed concern that federal court -defendants might-seek a trans-
fer to a different state solely because the substantive law of that
state would prove more favorable.272 Under the Van Dusen rule,
a federal judge receiving a transferred case applies the conflict-of-
law rules of the state where ,the plaintiff first brought suit to de-
termine which State's law -applies.273
267 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496-98 (1941). See
also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 639, 643-46 (1964).
268 Federal procedural rules typically govern all federal court cases, even those alleg-
ing state law claims. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (federal rule, rather
than Massachusetts statute, determined proper methods for serving process in federal
court diversity action); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)
(federal law, and not South Carolina state law, determined whether the parties would try
a federal court suit before a judge or a jury).
269 See, e.g., Masington, supra note 28, at 251.
270 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
271 Id. at 639. Van Dusen involved a ilefendant's transfer motion. The Supreme
Court recently held that the Van Dusen rule also applies where the plaintiff has moved
for a § 1404 transfer. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
272 The Van Dusen court stated: "The legislative history of § 1404(a). certainly does
not justify the rather startling conclusion that one might 'get a change of law as a bo-
nus for a change of venue.'" 376 U.S. at 635-36 (citations omitted). See also id. at 639
("A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with 'espect to state law, but
a change of courtrooms.").
273 The Van Dusen choice-of-law rule is one of the few aspects of the § 1404 motion
to transfer that has received regular scholarly examination. See, e.g., Currie, Change of
Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, (1960); Currie,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405 (1955); Note, Choice of
Law in Federal Court After Change of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 149 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court]. This article does not assess the merits of
the Van Dusen rule.
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In some cases, a federal judge receiving a transferred case
must spend relatively little time with a foreign state's law. Consid-
er a case transferred from the Northern Destrict of California to
the Northern District of Ohio. Under the Van Dusen rule, the
Ohio judge must apply California conflicts of law principles. If
California conflicts rules dictate that Ohio law applies to the suit,
the Ohio district judge will work with the law of his home state
until the suit has concluded.
But in other cases, a transfer only will complicate the applica-
tions of state law. After applying California conflicts rules, the
Ohio judge may have concluded that Illinois law applied to the
transferred case. The Ohio judge now must apply the laws of two
foreign states-California conflicts law and Illinois substantive law.
If this case had remainded in California, the California federal
judge need only have applied Illinois substantive law.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in James v. Bell
Helicopter Co. 74 illustrates the complex choice-of-law problems
that might arise after a transfer. The James suit involved a mysteri-
ous helicopter crash near Salmon, Idaho. Plaintiffs Jerry Jamef,
the helicopter pilot, and Rocky Mountain Helicopters, the helicop-
ter owner, brought a products liablity and negligence suit against
Defendant Bell Helicopter Company, which had sold the helicop-
ter, and Defendant Borg-Warner Corporation, which had manufac-
tured a clutch used in the helicopter. 75
The James plaintiffs initially filed suit in California state court.
The defendants removed the diversity case to a federal court in
California,276 which subsequently transferred the case to the
Northern District of Texas.277 The Texas district judge dismissed
the plaintiffs' products liability claims, and a jury found in favor
of both defendants on the plaintiffs' negligence claims. 27' The
plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court should not have
dismissed the plaintiffs' products liability claims.
Because a California court had transferred the James case to
Texas, the Van Dusen v. Barrack279 rule required the Texas fed-
eral court to apply California conlfict-of-law rules, to determine
274 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983).
275 Id. at 168.
276 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
277 James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1983).
278 Id. at 168-69.
279 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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which state's substantive law applied to the case.2"' The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals thus sought to choose the correct body
of state law by applying California's "governmental interest test,"
which required a review of "the interests of litigants and involved
states."281
Applying this. approach, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court that Texas law governed the plaintiffs' products
liability claim against Bell Helicopter, the seller of the destroyed
helicopter. The appellate panel reasoned that Texas, the residence
of Defendant Bell Helicopter, had adopted a strong policy of
allowing strict liability recovery only for personal injury, as op-
posed to the property damage alleged by the James plaintiffs.
Utah, the state where Plaintiff Rocky.Mountain resided, had devel-
oped no clear rule on this issue.2 2 The Fifth Circuit thus af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the products liability claim
brought against Bell Helicopter.83
I The circuit court next considered the plaintiffs' products
liability claim against. Defendant Borg-Warner, which had manufac-
tured a clutch used in the destroyed helicopter. Because Borg-
Warner maintained its principal place of business in Illinois,
California's conflict-of-law rules dictated that Illinois law should
govern the products liability claim, brought against Borg-Warner.
Applying Illinois law, the James court concluded that a plaintiff
could bring a strict liability suit for "physical damage," such as the
destruction of the helicopter.28 4 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the dismissal of the product liability claims brought
against Borg-Warner.28 5
The transfer of the James case from California to Texas did
not make the application of state law any easier. If the James case
had remained in California, a California federal judge would have
had to apply California conflict-of-law rules. The transfer of the
case merely forced a Texas judge to apply the foreign conflict-of-
law rules of California.28 6 The court receiving a transferred case
280 James v.. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d at 169.
281 Id. (quoting Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 161,
583 P.2d 721, 723, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1978)).
282 Id. at 170-72.
283 Id. at 172.
284 Id. at 173-74 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 I1. 2d 69,
82, 435 N.E.2d 442, 449 (1982)). See also id. at 174 n.8.
285 Id. at 174.
286 See also McVicar v. Standard Insulations, Inc., 824 F.2d 920, 921 (11th Cir. 1987)
(in a case transferred from Mississippi to Florida, Florida court must apply Mississippi
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thus always must apply some foreign state law.287 Court deci-
sions asserting that a transfer will eliminate the need to apply a
foreign state's law are mistaken.8 8
The application of state law may prove more difficult if a
case is transferred, because it forces a judge to apply foreign
conflict-of-law rules.289 This conclusion does not indicate that
district courts should reject all transfer motions. In cases where a
foreign district contains a vast majority of the relevant witnesses
and documents, the efficiency gained from litigation in the for-
eign district may outweigh the problems of applying a foreign
state's conflicts law. But courts should not conclude that the ap-
plication of state law necessarly will prove easier after a transfer.
C. Docket Congestion
Most courts have held that the relative docket congestion of
different districts is relevant to a section 1404 transfer.290 In
conflicts-of-law rules); Consul Limited v. Solide Enters., Inc., 802 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1986) (in consolidated cases, California conflicts-of-law principles would govern case
filed and litigated in California, while North Carolina conflicts-of-law principes would
govern case filed in North Carolina and transferred to California); Linnell v. Sloan, 636
F.2d 65, 66-67 (4th Cir. 1980) (where case had been transferred from the District of
Columbia, a Virginia court was required to apply District of Columibia choice-of-law
principles, which in turn required the court to apply Maryland substantive law); Mayo
Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967) (Illinois Controls Statue of Limitations
defense, in a case transferred to Minnesota).
287 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 134 ("After Barrack, every transferee court will have
to apply the conflicts laws of the transferor before it can arrive at the conclusion that
the substantive law of its own state controls.").
288 A few court decisions have asserted that a transfer is unlikely to simplify state
law interpretations. See Kendall U.S.A., Inc. v. Central Printing Co., 666 F. Supp. 1264,
1269 (N.D. Ind, 1987) ("Ohio law governs the substantive issues relating to the third-
party complaint under Indiana's choice of law rules. That will contine to be true after
transfer . . . ."); Peterson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F. Supp. 44, 46 (N.D. Ill.
1985) ("[F]amiliarity with state law does not weigh heavily in consideration of a motion
to transfer since a change of venue under § 1404(a) is to be 'but a change of court-
rooms.'").
See also Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
("By agreed order, the case was dismissed and refiled in this Court, a fortuitous circum-
stance given the choice of law complexities inherent in a transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).").
289 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1287 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting difficulty of applying a foreign state's choice-of-law rules "in an era when the
diversity among the States . in choice-of-law principles has become kaleidoscopic");
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 601; Marcus, supra note 11, at 682 (noting that a transfer
"greatly complicates" choice-of-law problems).
290 See, e.g., Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963); A. Olinick
& Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1966); Fanin v. Jones, 229
F.2d 368, 369-70 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Stoltz v. Baker, 466 F. Supp. 24, 29
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other words, statistics showing that the average case progresses
more quickly in another court will support a transfer. Alternative-
ly, statistics showing that the average case progresses more slowly
in a proposed transferee district weigh against a transfer.291
Like the other factors relevant to a transfer motion, courts
have diverged on the importance of docket -congestion statis-
tics.2 92 Most courts agree that a lighter docket in another court
does not, in and of itself, justify a transfer. 93 Beyond this basic
proposition, courts have come to little agreement about the im-
portance of relative docket congestion.
In some cases, courts have relied on a less congested docket
as a basis for transferring a suit. In Eichenholtz v. Brennan,294
plaintiff Paulette Eichenholtz brought both a class action and a
shareholders' derivative suit in the Southern District of New York.
the defendants moved to transfer this suit to the District of New
Jersey. In transferring the case to New Jersey, the Eichenholtz
court noted that while the Southern District of New York had
experienced a 2.4% increase in cases pending between June 30,
1985 and June 30, 1986, during the same period the district of
New Jersey had enjoyed a 0.8% decrease in cases pending.295
(M.D.N.C. 1978). See also Kaufman, supra note 6, at 606; Kitch, supra note 13, at 132
(relative docket congestion "is perhaps the most frequently discussed factor in the cas-
es.").
291. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Stuart Hall Co., 679 F. Supp, 1446, 1451-52 (S.D. Ohio
1987); American Argo v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 590 F. Supp. 1002, 1003
(E.D. Pa. 1984).
292 See Masington, supra note 28, at 244 ("Often the same court will find docket
congestion determinative in one case and immaterial in another, depending upon the
facts").
293 See, e.g., In re Scott, .709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reversing transfer of
Freedom of Information Act case to the Northern District of Georgia); Eichenholtz v.
Brennan, 677 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y, 1988). Cf Fanin v. Jones, 229 F.2d 368 (6th
Cir.) (per curiam), celi. denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1956).
This basic proposition is intuitively plausible. If docket congestion was itself a suffi-
cient reason to transfer a case, the district with the fewest filings per judge soon would
be swamped with disputes centered all over the country. Similary, "courts in congested
areas ...would have to grant [a) transfer in nearly every case where it was sought."
Masington, supra note 28, at 244 n.12.
294 677 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
295 Id. at 202. See also Solomon v. Continental Amer. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043,
1047 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding transfer, where "[t]he New Jersey district court had 353
pending cases per judge at the end of fiscal year 1972, while the Middle District of
North Carolina had 177"); A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 445
(2d Cir. 1966) ("[T]he trial court was entitled to attribute weight to the large difference
in docket crowding between the Eastern District of New York . ..and the Eastern Dis-
trict of Tennessee, Northern Division."); First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. White, 420 F.
Supp. 13 1, 1337 (D. Minn. 1976) (transferring case from the District of Minnesota to
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Plaintiffs also have relied on differences in docket congestion
to defeat motions to transfer. In AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automa-
tion, Inc.,2" 6 plaintiff AMF, Inc. brought suit in the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio. In declining to transfer the case to the Central
District of California, the AMF court noted: "[T]he median time
between filing and disposition by trial, of civil cases, was twenty-
five months in the Southern District of Ohio, while in the Central
District of California, the median time was thirty-one
months." '297
In other cases, however, courts have disregarded docket con-
gestion arguments in deciding section 1404 motions. In Hall v.
Kittay," s plaintiff Frank M. Hall brought a shareholders' deriva-
tive suit and class action in the District of Delaware. In transfer-
ring the case to the Southern District of New York, the Hall
court gave little weight to the plaintiffs contention that docket
conditions were worse in the New York district. Instead, the Hall
court wrote: "IT]he mere possibility of reaching trial in a shorter
space of time in Delaware (conjectural at most) does not justify
the denial of a transfer motion which is otherwise called
for . . .299
As an empirical matter, the difference in docket conditions
between districts rarely will be sufficient to produce a significant
effect on how rapidly a suit will proceed. If the District of Utah
and the Middle District of North Carolina represented the two
alternative courts that could hear a suit, the choice of forum
might effect how quickly the case would be resolved. In 1988, the
average civil case in the Middle District of North Carolina was
resolved in about four months, while the average civil case in the
District of Utah was concluded in about twenty-one months.300
However, such a disparity in court dockets is rare. In about
seventy-one percent of the federal districts, the average case is re-
solved in between six and ten months.30' In most cases, the
time involved in sending a file to a transferee court, assigning the
the District of Utah, where "this case can come to trial considerably sooner in Utah
than in this district.").
296 532 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
297 Id. at 1346; see also National Super Spuds v. New York Mercantile Exch., 425 F.
Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
298 396 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1975).
299 Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
300 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 193, at 216-19.
301 In 1988, the median civil case was resolved in between 6 and 10 months in 67
of the 94 federal districts. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 196, at 216-19.
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case to a new judge, and allowing the judge to familiarize herself
with the case probably will outweigh any benefits gained from a
less crowded calender.0 2 Not surprisingly, many decisions have
rejected arguments that one district will resolve a case more
quickly than an alternative district 30 3
Even if greater disparities existed in docket conditions among
the federal districts, it is unclear why such disparities should be
relevant to a transfer motion. Section 1404 transfers could be
viewed as a mechanism to equalize the judicial workload in differ-
ent districts. But appointment of more judges to overburdened
districts represents the obvious method for equalizing federal
court dockets °4 Attempting to aid overburdened districts by
transferring one case at a time is similar to bailing out a sinking
ship with an empty coffee can. If anything, reading and research-
ing transfer motions, some of them frivolous, will impose more
work on district judges in already overburdened courts.
A second rationale for considering relative court dockets is
based on fairness to parties, rather than on equalizing judges'
caseloads. Courts have justified transfers on the grounds that the
parties will benefit from the more rapid case resolution occurring
in a less congested court."0 5 Such a quick resolution should
prove particularly desirable for the plaintiff, the party who typical-
ly will oppose a defendant's section 1404 transfer motion. The
plaintiff presumably will prefer a prompt award of damages or
other relief.
But this assumption that a plaintiff will prefer a speedier
result in a different district conflicts with the choice of forum
actually made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel presumably
302 Courts also face difficulties in assessing docket congestion arguments, because
different decisions have relied on different statistics to determine docket congestion. See
AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1335, 1346 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
-(comparing statistics on the median period between the filing of a civil case and its
disposition by trial); Neff Athletic Lettering Co. v. Waiters, 524 F. Supp. 268, 274 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) (comparing the number of cases per judge pending in two different dis-
tricts); Stoltz v. Baker, 466 F. Supp. 24, 29 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (comparing a variety of
statistics that might illustrate relative docket congestion).
303 See, e.g., Dejesus v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 725 F. Supp. 207, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Emerald Coast Spring Water Co., 697 F. Supp.
767, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("With all due respect to the Northern District of Florida, it is
unlikely that any court bears as crushing a burden as does the Southern District of New
York."); Eastern Scientific Mktg. v. Tekna-Seal, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 173, 179 n.12 (E.D. Va.
1988); Babbidge v. Apex Oil Co., 676 F. Supp. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Austin v.
Johns-Mansville Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
304 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 137.
305 Kaufman, supra note 6, at 606.
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possessed at least some rough idea of the varying docket condi-
tions in different courts. Nonetheless, the plaintiff decided to file
suit in a relatively slow-moving court.
A plaintiff may possess several valid reasons for sacrificing a
speedier resolution of his case. The plaintiff may believe that he
can more easily gain the cooperation of important witnesses if his
case goes to trial at the local courthouse, rather than hundreds of
miles away. The plaintiff may have enjoyed a positive past experi-
ence or an exceptional working relationship with his attorney,
who practices in the district where the plaintiff has filed suit. This
attorney may feel more comfortable with the local rules and pro-
cedures in the district where he has filed suit. In short, for a
court to inform a plaintiff that he actually will be better off liti-
gating in a different forum, because that court may resolve the
plaintiff's case more quickly, seems unreasonably paternalistic.
The transfer of a case to a less congested court is unlikely to
result in any appreciable benefits to the federal court system. The
fact that'a foreign district resolves an average case more quickly
does not mean that both parties to a suit will benefit from litigat-
ing in that district. In short, relative docket conditions should not
effect transfer decisions.
D. Related Litigation Pending in a Different District-
Courts have cited the pendency of related litigation in a dif-
ferent federal district as a favorite justification for a section 1404
transfer.0 6 Like every other factor considered in motion to
transfer analysis, different courts have placed vastly different mea-
sures of importance on the pendency of related litigation. While
many courts have granted transfer motions based on the presence
of related litigation in another court,3 7 others have denied such
motions. 08
306 See, e.g., Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528-29 (5th Cir.
1988); Wyndham Assoc. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977
(1968); Marcus, supra note 11, at 716; Waggoner, supra note 13, at 72.
307 See, e.g., Countryman v. Stein, Roe & Farnham, 681 F. Supp. 479, 484-85 (N.D.
I1. 1987) (transferring case to the Northern District of New York); Chrysler Capital
Corp. v. Woehling, 663 F. Supp. 478, 483 (D. Del. 1987) ("[S]uits involving the same
legal and factual issues should be decided in one court and not permitted to proceed in
two different courts."); Berg v. First Amer. Bankshares, 576 F. Supp. 1239, 1243
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (transferring case to the District of Columbia). See also Masington, supra
note 28, at 245 (consolidation of related cases is "one of the strongest reasons for trans-
fer because minimizing the number of trials directly serves the interest of justice").
308 See, e.g., Mowtown Record Corp. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 174, 174
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Like the other factors currently balanced in the section 1404
calculus, transferring a case to the site of related litigation initially
seems plausible. A prior pending case may have familiarized a
judge with a factual dispute and the relevant law. This judge pre-
sumably would resolve a transferred case more quickly and easily
than a judge who had no previous experience with the contested
factual or legal issues80 9 Such benefits were asserted by Justice
Hugo L. Black in a frequently-cited Supreme Court opinion.310
If a transfer to a district hearing a related case conferred
such obvious benefits, one must wonder why plaintiffs have op-
posed thfese motions. Presumably, a plaintiff bringing suit and
wishing to collect a judgment will seek a quick path to such a
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (transfer denied, where "related" case in the Western District of New
York was filed four months after the plaintiff's suit); International Brotherhood of Paint-
ers and Allied Trades Union v. Best Painting & Sandblasting Co., 621 F. Supp. 906, 908'
(D.D.C. 1985) (declining to transfer case to the Southern District of AlabamaC, where
related case was pending); General Battery Corp. v. TSS-Seedman's, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
488, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (declining to transfer case to the Eastern District 'of New York).
Section 1404 is not the primary mechanism for consolidating complex litigation.
Under § 1407 of the judicial code, a judicial panel on multidistrict litigation is autho-
rized to transfer cases "involving one or more common questions of fact" to "any dis-
trict for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." See Waggoner, supra note 13,
at 74 ("The inability of section 1404 to deal with problems of multi-district litigation is
hardly surprising, because the section was not designed for that purpose."). Where a
mass disaster or an extensive securities fraud results in a large number of suits, the
courts will consolidate these suits pursuant to § 1407, rather than § 1404. See, e.g., In re
Dow Chem. Co. Sarabond Prods. Liability' Litig., '650 F. Supp. 187 (J.P.M.D.L. 1986)
(consolidating in the District of Colorado "14 suits that alleged injuries from a toxic
chemical); In re LTV Corp. Securities Litig., 470 F. Supp. 859 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (the
Northern District of Texas was the most convenient forum for seven securities fraud
suits alleging that a corporation had made material mistatements in reports and prospec-
tuses). But courts have held that § 1407 only applies where a fairly large number' of
related suits are filed. See, e.g., In re Scilia Di R. Biebow & Company Contract Litig.,
490 F. Supp. 513, 515 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980) (refusing to order consolidation under § 1407,
where only two related' cases were pending in different districts); In re Magic Marker
Securities Litigation, 470 F. Supp. 862, 865-66 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (same).
309 See, e.g., Skyline Displays, Inc. v. Sweeney, 634 F. Supp. 746, 748 (D. Minn. 1986)
("It would be wasteful of the time and resources of both the courts and the parties to
permit cases arising out of the same situation to proceed in both Minnesota and Califor-
nia."); Berg v. First Amer. Bankshares, 576 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Sundance Leasing v. Bingham, 503 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1980) ("Considerations
of judicial economy and efficiency clearly support a policy of having substantially similar
matters litigated before the same tribunal.").
310 Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960) ("To permit a
situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pend-
ing in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy, and money-that
§ 1404(a) was designed to prevent.").
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judgment."' Yet plaintiffs typically have opposed motions to
transfer based on the pendency of a related case.
Such plaintiff opposition suggests that some suits purportedly
related to a pending case in fact have little in common with the
other case.312 In such situations, the plaintiff and the courts will
receive no benefit from a transfer, because the judge receiving
the transferred case will have no more knowledge of the relevant
facts and law than the judge who initially transferred the case.8' 3
The sole party benefitting from the transfer is the defendant, who
has succeeded in moving the case out of the forum chosen by the
plaintiff.
The above analysis suggests that courts should examine the
similarities of pending cases thoroughly before transferring a case
to a district that is hearing a case described by the defendant as
"related." But such a thorough examination, involving extensive
briefing and perhaps hearing, would conflict with the convenience
and expediency that should accompany a section 1404 trans-
fer. 14
A court faced with a transfer motion based on related litiga-
tion must choose between two unattractive alternatives. If a court
simply accepts the defendant's transfer argument because a relat-
311 On the benefits that a defendant receives from litigation delay, see supra text
accompanying notes 116-27.
312 See, e.g., Rouse Woodstock, Inc. v. Surety Federal Says. & Loan Ass'n, 630 F.
Supp. 1004, 1013-14 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (declining to transfer case to North Carolina, where
action pending in North Carolina involved different factual and legal issues); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 679 F. Supp. 1455, 1464 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (declining
to transfer suit where "the questions of law, fact, and evidence raised by the two cases
are dissimilar"); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Southern Utils., Inc., 524 F. Supp.
692, 694 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (denying motion to transfer case to Missouri, "as the instant
action involves two claims not subject to resolution in the Missouri suit"); Payne v. AHFI
Netherlands, IB.V., 482 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (refusing to transfer case to
California district hearing "related" suit, where the suits "are not as related as they may
at first glance have appeared").
313 In addition, a "related" suit filed in a different district probably would be gov-
erned by a different body of substantive law than the suit that a defendant seeks to
transfer. See Waggoner, supra note 13, at 74. See also supra text accompanying notes 268-
88.
314 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1282 (1990) (courts should not
adopt a method of deciding transfers which "would turn what is supposed to be a stat-
ute for convenience of the courts into one expending extensive judicial time and re-
sources"); Rouse Woodstock, Inc. v. Surety Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 1004,
1011 (N.D. Il. 1986) ("An evidentiary hearing on such potentially outcome-determinative
questions seems inappropriate merely to place venue.").
One article-notes some suggestions that prior to a transfer decision, "a hearing is
required by due process of law." Kitch, supra note 13, at 136. The article concludes:
"The absurdity of this procedure needs no comment." Id.
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ed case is pending, the court probably will grant too many trans-
fer motions, to the possible prejudice of plaintiffs. On the other
hand, if the court attempts to determine whether the pending
case cited by the defendant is indeed similar to the suit that the
defendant seeks to transfer, the process will involve unacceptable
expense and delay for both parties.
But even if courts instantly could determine the degree of
similarity between two suits, a court still should not transfer a suit
simply because a related case was pending in a foreign district. If
the similarity between two cases automatically justified a transfer,
a defendant who faced frequent suits arising out of similar facts
could transfer the plaintiff's suit to any district where the defen-
dant preferred to litigate. Such a result, however, would conflict
with a long tradition that allows the plaintiff, and not the defen-
dant, to choose where litigation should proceed.1 5
Consider a hypothetical problem. The Thornton Automobile
Corporation is incorporated in the hypothetical state of Jefferson,
and maintains its principal place of business .within that state.
Like any automobile manufacturer, Thornton Automobile each
year defends a large number of products liability suits based on
certain alleged mechanical defects, such as faulty brakes or steer-
ing mechanisms.
Because Thornton Automobile sells its cars throughout the
country, Thornton Automobile faces suit in several different fed-
eral districts, as well as in the Jefferson federal court."1 6
Thornton Automobile would prefer to defend all these suits in its
home state of Jefferson. Thornton Automobile is well acquainted
with the Jefferson federal courts and their procedures. Juries in
Jefferson are thought to be sympathetic to automobile manufac-
turers, because so many of the state's residents work in the auto-
mobile industry.
Now assume that a Northern District of California products
liability suit names Thornton Automobile as the defendant, alleg-
ing that Thornton Automobile placed defective brakes in one of
its cars. Thornton Automobile faces a similar suit alleging a brake
system defect in the District of Jefferson federal court. Thornton
315 See infra text accompanying notes 325-29.
316 For diversity jurisdiction purposes, Thornton Automobile would be a citizen of
the State of Jefferson. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988). Where a citizen of a state other
than Jefferson brought suit against Thornton Automobile, and the suit alleged an
.amount in controversy" in excess of $50,000, this plaintiff could bring his suit in feder-
al court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
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Automobile brings a motion to transfer the California suit to
Jefferson, where the related suit is pending. The allegations of the
California and Jefferson suits indeed are very similar, and the
Northern District of California grants Thornton Automobile's
transfer motion.
A second plaintiff now brings a suit against Thornton Auto-
mobile in the Northern District of Illinois. This Illinois suit also
alleges a brake system defect. Thornton Automobile again moves
to transfer, and now cites the pendency of the two related suits
in the District of Jefferson-the suit filed in Jefferson, and the
suit transferred from California. Given the pendency of not one,
but two related suits in a foreign district, the Northern District of
Illinois transfers this second suit to the District of Jefferson.
The logical conclusion of such repreated transfers is that
Thornton Automobile will litigate brake defect' suits only in the
District of Jefferson, where it is domiciled. But such a result con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction decisions,
which explicitly have repudiated a rule allowing suit only in the
defendant's state of domicile. 17
Such a result also seems unfair. Thornton Automobile does
business nationwide, and presumably will face relatively little diffi-
culty in litigating outside of its district of domicile. On the other
hand, the plaintiffs who have brought suit against Thornton Auto-
mobile may have no connections with the state of Jefferson, and
may face serious prejudice if a court transfers their cases to Jef-
ferson.
Deciding motions to transfer on the basis of a "related" suit
pending in a foreign court seems neither feasible nor appropriate.
Like the other factors discussed above, this factor should have
little bearing on transfer decisions.
E. Motions to Transfer, Ad Hoc Balancing and Personal Jurisdiction:
A Summary
Part III has reviewed the multi-factor, case-by-case balancing
employed in section 1404 transfer decisions. This Part also has
reviewed four factors considered by courts deciding transfer mo-
tions: (1) the plaintiffs suit in his home forum; (2) the applicable
law; (3) the relative docket congestion; and (4) the presence of
related litigation pending in a different district.
317 See infra text accompanying notes 325-29.
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This Part has concluded that these factors actually demon-
strate little about the relative convenience of different districts.
But even if each of these factors were relevant-to a convenience
determination, the multi-factor, case-specific balancing used to
decide transfer motions still would be inappropriate.
First, the use of this multi-factor test results in a bias against
parties lacking in resources or inexperienced in federal court
litigation. Because courts decide transfers on the basis of so many
different factors, parties must file lengthy transfer briefs that in-
clude complex arguments."' 8 The regular federal court practitio-
ner will know that statistics on the docket conditions in different
districts appear in the Annual Report of the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts.19 A state court personal
injury litigator, who appears in federal court only in a rare diver-
sity case,320 may be unfamiliar with this volume.
Similarly, a well-financed litigant may willingly pay an associ-
ate at a large law firm to spend hours developing complex choice-
of-law arguments that support or disfavor a transfer. A litigant of
more humble means may be unable to finance a response to such
elaborate arguments. 1
In short, while Congress intended section 1404 to promote
convenient and efficient litigation, the current multi-factor balanc-
ing approach insures that transfer litigation will be neither quick
nor inexpensive. 2 Instead, the parties may engage in expensive
and time-consuming "satellite litigation" on the proper forum for
a suit before addressing the merits of their dispute.323
318 See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 607 (rioting the "voluminous affidavits presented"
in transfer litigation).
319 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 193, at 216-19.
320 Federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims-"diversity
jurisdiction"-where the adverse parties are citizens of differ6nt states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988).
321 One commentator suggests that many rules, both procedural and substantive, re-*
suit in a similar bias. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the"
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 124 (1974) ("the rules are sufficiently
complex and ptoblematic . . . that differences in the quantity and quality of legal servic-
es will affect capacity to derive advantages from the rules").
322 See Kitch, supra note 13, at 101 ("Section 1404(a) rulings have become one of
the battery of motions by which a defendant can introduce matters peripheral to the
merits and postpone the day of trial.").
323 The term "satellite litigation" typically describes motions to sanction attorneys.
Such motions have little relationship to the underlying dispute that resulted in the alleg-
edly improper attorney conduct. See, e.g., Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Develop-
ing Law of Sanctions, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 587, 606-07 (1987); Scwharzer, supn note 128,
at 1017-18. The term seems equally applicable to transfer litigation,, which also has little
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Also, as discussed above, the case-by-case balancing employed
to decide transfer motions results in uncertainty. Parties cannot
predict whether a court will transfer any particular case. Such
uncertainty is inherent in the use of an ad hoc balancing test,
which weighs an extensive list of factors on a case-by-case ba-
sis.3 24 But such uncertainty is particularly inappropriate in decid-
ing the proper forum for a civil suit.3
25
Traditionally, the plaintiff bringing a civil suit has enjoyed
broad lattitude in determining where to file his action.126 The
Court long ago repudiated its once restrictive reading of personal
jurisdiction, 27 and adopted the modern rule that a defendant
may be subject to suit in any district where the defendant possess-
es "minimum contacts." 28 Because a defendant sued outside of
his state of residence may take advantage of modern
transportation and communication, the Court found no justifica-
tion for a strict limitation on a plaintiffs choice of forum. 29
But given the uncertainty accompanying section 1404 transfers,
the "minimum contacts" standard may provide federal court plain-
tiffs with a significant choice of forums only in theory, and not in
practice. 3 0
Consider a plaintiff who seeks a speedy resolution of his case
against a corporate defendant. The plaintiff wishes to file suit in a
particular district well-removed from the defendant's principal
place of business. The defendant's activities in the plaintiffs dis-
relationship with the underlying dispute between two parties.
324 See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055-56 (11th ed. 1985); Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 978-80 (1987).
325 See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 608.
326 326Ely, The Irrepresible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 710 (1974); Marcus,
supra note 11, at 678 (noting "the presumed legislative intent behind section 1404(a) to
preserve the plaintiffs 'venue privilege' to shop for favorable state law"); Seidelson,
supra note 3, at 85 ("It is appropriate to presume, at least in limine, that plaintiff is the
wronged party and defendant the wrongdoer. If one must bear the inconvenience of a
foreign forum, therefore, it should be the defendant.").
But cf Stein, supra note 3, at 844-45 (favoring "elimination of the deference accord-
ed a plaintiffs choice of forum").
327 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
328 The "minimum contacts" test was adopted in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987).
329 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980);
Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
330 Cf Stein, supra note 3, at 785 (criticizing the "crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious,
and inconsistent decisions" that have developed under the doctrine of forum non conve-
niens).
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trict of choice satisfy the "minimum contacts" required for per-
sonal jurisdiction.
But if the plaintiff files suit in his district of choice, the de-
fendant may move for a transfer to the district where its pri ncipal
place of business is located. The plaintiff has no certhinty of de-
feating such a motion. Even if a district judge eventually denies
the transfer motion, the plaintiff will suffer the expense and delay
that accompanies transfer litigation.
The plaintiff is certain to avoid such expense and delay only
by filing suit where the defendant maintains its principal place of
business. Only in this situation will a defendant be unable to file
a transfer motion asserting that an alternative district is more
convenient.
The current method of deciding transfer motions stands the
Supreme Court's law of personal jurisdiction on its head. The
Court purportedly has authorized a suit in any forum where a
defendant possesses "minimum contacts." 3 ' But unless a plain-
tiff can afford the time and expense of a section 1404 transfer
dispute, the plaintiff may feel' compelled to file suit in the
defendant's "home forum." The asserted broad right of a plaintiff
to choose where her suit will proceed thus exists only in theory.
Standards that would result in consistent and predictable
transfer decisions are sorely needed. If clear standards delineated
when courts should grant a section 1404 motion, a plaintiff often
could file suit in his district of preference without fearing an
eventual transfer to a distant court. Because more specific stan-
dards would render certain transfer motions clearly
unmeritorious, civil defendants could not seek delay by filing
transfer motions as a matter of course. The reduction in transfer
motions would reduce the litigation expenses faced by civil parties
and the workload of the federal courts.
Part IV of this Article suggests one simplified and more pre-
dictable approach for resolving section 1404 motions.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR RESOLVING MOTIONS TO
TRANSFER
The ad hoc balancing currently used to decide section 1404
transfer motions is unsatisfactory. This nebulous balancing has
resulted in conflicting decisions, and has prompted an excessive
331 Of course, the federal court: plaintiff also must establish that she has filed suit in
a proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403 (1988).
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filing of unfounded transfer motions. Courts have transferred
cases far from the district where the plaintiff initially filed suit,
despite apparent prejudice to the plaintiff. The section 1404 trans-
fer is returning the federal courts to the restrictive notions of a
proper forum seemingly repudiated in the Supreme Court's per-
sonal jurisdiciton opinions.
The concluding Section of this Article suggests a simple,
straightforward test to replace the vague balancing test currently
employed by the federal courts. Under this proposed test:
(1) a court would determine whether to transfer a case solely
by comparing the number of relevant witnesses and documents
located in or near each of two alternative districts;
(2) the defendant moving for a transfer would bear a clear
burden of demonstrating that an alternative district will contain
more of the relevant witnesses and documents;
(3) the federal courts could transfer a case only once;
(4) a district court could transfer a case only to another dis-
trict where the plaintiff possessed minimum contacts; and
(5) courts would recognize an exception for cases involving
forum selection clauses. Where a valid and relevant forum selec-
tion clause specified an alternative forum, courts would .be re-
quired to transfer the case to the forum specified in the clause.
The following discussion explores each part of this test, and
explains how the test would yield different results from the ap-
proach currently used to decide section 1404 motions.
A. Elements of the Test
1. The Proximity of Alternate Courts to Documents and
Witnesses
Under the proposed test, courts would consider only a single
factor in determining whether to transfer a case-the proximity of
alternative forums to witnesses and documents.33 2 This factor al-
ready has received significant emphasis in a number of transfer
decisions.33
332 In cases where a valid forum selection clause was applicable, a court automatical-
ly would transfer a case to the forum specified in that clause. The court would not de-
cide these cases based on the location of relevant witnesses and documents. See infra
text accompanying notes 353-76.
333 See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Del.
1986) ("The availability of witnesses . . . is in the context of this case the most crucial
factor in deciding this motion to transfer."); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp.,
487 F. Supp. 254, 262 (W.D. Mo. 1980) ("The most important factor in passing on a
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Litigating a case in a district that contains most of the rele-
vant Witnesses and documents will prove convenient for at least
two reasons. First, during discovery, both parties may seek rulings
on their right to inspect specific documents, or their right to
require a witness to answer specific questions during a deposition.
If the court hearing the case is located near the site of a docu-
ment review or deposition, obtaining a discovery ruling should
prove easier than if the relevant court is located across the coun-
try.
3 34
Second, witnesses testifying at trial will save travel time and
expense. 5 If a case involves voluminous documentary evidence,
the parties will also save the cost of transporting these documents
from a distant office or warehouse. 36
A district court thus will prove convenient for litigation if
most witnesses and documents can be found nearby. If the rele-
vant documents and witnesses are not located within or near a
district, that court will not provide a convenient site for litigation.
One might object that basing transfer decisions solely on the
location of relevant documents and witnesses will prove overly
simplistic. Other factors, such as an extreme disparity in the dock-
et congeston of two courts, might conceivably be relevant in some
cases.33 7 But a continued reliance on the ad hoc balancing of
multiple factors will be accompanied by a continued lack of pre-
dictability in transfer decisions, together with excessive transfer
litigation.
Basing transfer decisions solely on the location of relevant
documents and witnesses would have several positive effects on
motion to transfer under § 1404(a) is the convenience of witnesses."); Masington, supra
note 28, at 242.
334 See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1102, 1103 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Supco Automotive Parts v. Triangle Auto Spring Co., 538 F. Supp. 1187, 1193
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
335 See, e.g., Cunnigham v. Cunningham, 477 F. Supp. 632, 636 (N.D. II. 1979)
(transferring case to the Western District of Michigan); McGuire v. Singer Co., 441 F.
Supp. 210, 214 (D.V.I. 1977) (transferring part of the case to the Southern District of
New York, where "a transfer to said forum would decrease the travelling and lodging
expenses of all prospective witnesses").
336 See Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1968) (dis-
trict court should have transferred case, where a trial in Hawaii would require the defen-
dants to ship "up to one thousand file drawers of records"); Oudes-v. Block, 516 F.
Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1981) (transferring case to the Northern District of West Virginia,
where relevant documents were "quite voluminous and located entirely in West Virgin-
ia").
337 But of. supra text accompanying notes 289-304 (questioning whether relative dock-
et conditions should be relevant to a motion to transfer).
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transfer litigation. Defendants would make fewer transfer motions.
Where a plaintiff brought suit in a district that contained the
majority of witnesses or documents, a transfer would not be possi-
ble.
Litigation of transfer motions would involve a much simpler
process. Parties would no longer prepare lengthy and complex
briefs discussing a long list of factors. Instead, the parties would
only discuss the location of relevant witnesses and documents. 3
Basing transfer decisions solely on the location of the docu-
ments and witnesses also would promote consistent district court
decisions. Because the district courts would resolve transfer mo-
tions after reviewing far fewer factors than under the current
multi-factor balancing approach, these courts could achieve greater
consistency.
Finally, under the suggested approach, meaningful appellate
review of transfer decisions would be facilitated. District courts no
longer would decide section 1404 motions after a vague balancing
of numerous factors. Because a narrower set of criteria would be
revelant to a transfer, appellate courts could identify instances of
reversible error.
2. Burden on the Defendant
Under the suggested approach, the defendant seeking a trans-
fer would bear a clear burden of demonstrating the advantages of
an alternative district. Some cases have held that the defendant
already possesses such a burden. These decisions have declined to
transfer a case when the merits of alternative districts are "in
equipoise."3 9 But other decisions have granted transfer motions
even though the defendant has made only a minimal showing that
a different district would prove more convenient than the court
chosen by the plaintiff.34 °
338 Under this suggested approach, parties could bring or oppose motions to transfer
in more limited circumstances. Courts thus could conclude that certain transfer motions
were frivolous, and could impose rule 11 sanctions under appropriate circumstances. See
also supr-a text accompanying notes 128-34 (describing the current disinclination of courts
to impose rule 11 sanctions for frivolous transfer motions).
339 Ayers v. Arabian American Oil Corp., 571 F. Supp. 707, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (re-
fusing to transfer case from the Southern District of New York to the Southern District
of Texas); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 208, 211
(D. Del. 1977) (motion to transfer case to the District of Columbia denied). See also
Sollinger v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. VL 1987) ("Absent a clear
and convincing showing that the balance of convenience strongly favors an alternate
forum, discretionary transfers are not favored.").
340 See, e.g., Environmental Serv., Inc. v. Bell Lumber & Pole Co., 607 F. Supp. 851,
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Placing a clear burden on the defendant would limit transfer
motions to cases where the forum 'chOsen by a plaintiff could
result in serious prejudice to the moving defendant. Such a rule
also would follow from the general civil litigation principle that a
moving party bears the burden of establishing that a court should
grant her motion.341
Finally, as discussed above, the transfer of any case inherently
will cause both parties to suffer immediate expense and delay.
342
Because a transfer always will involve such costs, courts should
require a moving defendant to make a persuasive argument as to
the advantages of another district.
3. Only One Transfer of Any Case Allowed
Under the suggested approach, the federal courts could trans-
fer a case only once. After a single transfer had occurred, the
districtijudge receiving the case would see the litigation through
to .its conclusion, even if her court proved to be.a relatively poor
site for the suit.
Allowing only one transfer of any case would eliminate the
problem of multiple transfers, where judges shuffle a case from
one courthouse to another.343 Such repeated examinations of a
transfer decision are inappropriate in a federal system beset by
delay and backlog, judicial ping-pong weakens the integrity of the
federal courts.
All members of the federal judiciary possess the competency
to hear any case, even when an errant transfer has brought a case
to an inconvenient forum. Because each transfer motion will
cause parties to suffer expense and delay, multiple transfers are
inconsistent with the convenience that section 1404'Was designed
to promote. If the courts cannot locate the optimal' site for litiga-
tion without several transfer rulings, the game is simply not worth
the candle.
854 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (transferring case to Minnesota, where "the convenience of the par-
ties is neutral"); Neff Athletic Lettering Co. v. Walters, 524 F. Supp. 268, 272 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (transferring case to New Hampshire where "the question is a relatively close
one").
341 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 325 (1986) (the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the basis for the motion); Tally
Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 1989) (the
party moving for a preliminary injunction bears the burden of proof).
342 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 199-228.
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4. The Plaintiff Must Possess Minimum Contacts With the
District Receiving a Transferred Case
The law of personal jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to bring suit
against a defendant only in a state with which the defendant pos-
sesses "minimum contacts."3 " Under the current interpretation
of section 1404, however, a court conceivably may transfer a case
to any district-even a district with which the plaintiff possesses
no contacts.3 45 Where a significant distance separates a transfer-
ee court from the plaintiffs residence, a transfer may cause the
plaintiff to suffer serious prejudice.
To eliminate this anomaly, district courts should possess au-
thority to transfer cases only to a state with which the plaintiff
possesses minimum contacts. 3 4 1 This limitation would replace
the longstanding Hoffman v. Blaski 47 rule, which precludes any
transfer to a district that is an improper venue, or that lacks per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant. 4"
As discussed above, courts have developed the concepts of
venue and personal jurisdiction primarily to protect the civil de-
fendant.349 Where a defendant voluntarily moves to transfer the
case, the defendant does not need the safeguards afforded by the
venue and personal jurisdiction requirements.35 ° Instead, it is
the plaintiff who needs protection against litigating in a forum
with which he lacks any contacts.3 5
344 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987);
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
345 Waggoner, supra note 13, at 77.
346 Professor Michael J. Waggoner has suggested a very similar proposal:
This article proposes a third interpretation of the phrase 'where [the ac-
tion] might have been brought.' That phrase, this article suggests, refers to any
district where the party seeking transfer might have brought the action ....
[Where the defendant has filed a section 1404 motion,] [tiransfers would be
authorized to districts in which personal jurisdiction and. venue would have been
satisfied for a hypothetical action on the same subject matter brought by the
true defendant against the true plaintiff.
Waggoner, supra note 13, at 75 (first alteration in original).
347 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
348 See supra text accompanhing notes 79-106.
349 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
350 Retention of the Hoffman rule seems appropriate in the relatively unusual case
where a plaintiff moves for a § 1404 transfer. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S.
Ct. 1274 (1990). As discussed above, the issues raised by a plaintiffs transfer motion are
beyond the scope of this article.
351 Decisions traditionally have employed the "minimum contacts" standard in deter-
mining a court's authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Minimum
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The suggested approach would eliminate the inconsistent and
confusing rules on the proper weight that a plaintiff's choice of
forum should receive in transfer analysis. If a plaintiff has con-
ducted no activity outside the district where he brought suit, then
a federal court could not transfer the suit. On the other hand,
where a plaintiff conducts extensive business throughout the Unit-
ed States, the plaintiff's decision to file suit in his "home forum"
should in no way preclude a transfer.5 2
This suggested approach also would result in a symmetry
between the law of personal jurisdiction and the law governing
section 1404 transfers. Under the law of personal jurisdiction, a
defendant cannot be required to defend a suit unless he possesses
minimum contacts with the forum state. 53 Under the approach
suggested in this article, a plaintiff would not be required to pros-
ecute a suit transferred to a distant state, unless the plaintiff simi-
larly possesses minimum contacts with that state.
5. The Forum Selection Clause Exception
In some cases, the parties have previously agreed to litigate
certain disputes in a predetermined forum. Courts have referred
to such a contractual agreement as a "forum selection clause." A
plaintiff sometimes will bring suit outside of the court specified in
the forum selection clause. The approach advocated in .this article
would require a court, on the motion of a defendant, to transfer
such a case to the court specified in a relevant and enforceable
forum selection clause.
contacts analysis may prove useful in confronting a variety of issues that focus on the
relationship of an individual or a dispute to a geographical unit. See, e.g., Wasserman,
supra note 192, at 138-42 (minimum contacts analysis would advance proper determina-
tions of state subpoena power over non-resident witnesses).
352 Some cases have considered the prejudice to a plaintiff that will result from a
transfer. See, e.g., Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.
1988) ("This case is not being consigned to the wastelands of Siberia or some remote,
distant area of the Continental United States.:); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter, 371
F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1967) (affirming district court denial of defendants' transfer
motion, where a transfer would have forced the plaintiff "to travel nearly across the
continent to pursue his litigation").
Concerns that a transfer may prejudice a plaintiff are appropriate. See supra text
accompanying notes 235-52. But unlike the minimum contacts requirement proposed
here, current decisions provide no certain protection to a plaintiff opposing a transfer
motion. In addition, some decisions largely have failed to consider possible plaintiff prej-
udice resulting from a transfer. See supra text accompanying notes 178-98.
353 See supra text accompanying notes 328-332.
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To date, courts have treated motions to transfer that rely on
a forum selection clause much like any other transfer motion.
Courts have described the presence of a forum selection clause as
just one of many relevant factors. 54 Judges have reached very
different conclusions on the importance of a forum selection
clause. 5  Some courts have relied heavily on such a clause in
granting a motion to transfer. 56 Other courts have denied mo-
tions to transfer, despite the presence of a forum selection
clause. 35
7
The Supreme Court recently approved this case-by-case ap-
proach to forum selection clauses in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp.35 Plaintiff Stewart Organization brought suit against
Defendant Ricoh, alleging breach of a contract that obligated
Stewart Organization to sell Ricoh's products. This contract con-
tained a forum selection clause, which provided that a party must
bring any suit arising out of the contract in Manhattan.3 59
Stewart Organization, an Alabama Corporation, instead
brought a diversity suit against Ricoh in the Northern District of
Alabama. Defendant Ricoh moved to transfer the suit to the
354 See, e.g., Red Bull Assoc. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir.
1988); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757-58 (3d Cir. 1973); Rouse
Woodstock, Inc. v. Surety Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 630 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
355 Compare Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Such
an agreement [to a forum selection clause] does not obviate the need for an analysis of
the factors set forth in § 1404(a) and does not necessarily preclude the granting of the
motion to transfer.") with Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131,
134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("the forum-selection clause is determinative as to the convenience
of-the parties").
356 See, e.g., Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirm-
ing district court's transfer of case from Pennsylvania to Utah, which relied in part on a
forum selection clause); In re Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Where the parties have by contract selected a forum, it is incumbent upon the party
resisting to establish that the choice was unreasonable, unfair, or unjust."); Advent Elec.,
Inc. v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. 709 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (court
transfers case from Illinois to California, relying heavily on a forum selection clause). See
also Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States District Court, 872 F.2d 310, 311-12
(9th Cir. 1989).
357 Red Bull Assoc. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988)
(affirming district judge's refusal to transfer case from the Southern District of New
York to the District of Arizona); Fibra-Streel, Inc. v. Astoria Indus., Inc., 708 F. Supp.
255, 257 (E.D. Mo. 1989) ("The Court cannot say that the forum selection clause, with-
out more, weighs heavily enough to tip the scales away from plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum."); Galli v. Travelhost, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1260, 1262-64 (D. Nev. 1985) (denying
motion to transfer case to Texas, although the parties had agreed to a forum selection
clause specifying Texas as the proper venue for any suit).
358 487 U.S. 22 (1988). See also supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
359 Id. at 24.
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Southern District of New York, relying heavily on the forum selec-
tion clause. The district court denied the transfer motion,36 ° and
Ricoh appealed.3 "6
The Stewart Organization decision did not explicitly rule on
whether the district court erred in denying the motion to transfer
despite the presence of the forum selection clause 62 However,
some Court language seemed to approve the case-by-case consider-
ation of forum selection clauses embraced by lower court transfer
decisions. 63
The authority of courts to deny a transfer motion despite the
presence of a forum selection clause conflicts with the law of
personal jurisdiction. Where an applicable forum selection clause
is raised in a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court has held that only a court specified in the
forum clause may resolve the dispute. This rule constitutes an
exception to modern personal jurisdiction principles, which typi-
cally authorize resolution of a dispute in any forum where a de-
fendant possesses "minimum contacts. '"364
The Court announced this limiting effect of forum selection
clauses in The Bremen v. Zapata Co.365 In Bremen, an admiralty
action arose out of an agreement by defendant Unterwesser to
tow Plaintiff Zapata's barge, the Chaparral. The towing contract
between Zapata, an American corporation, and Unterwesser, a
German corporation, included a forum selection clause. The
360 -d.
361 The district court certified the case for an immediate appeal after its transfer
ruling, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). As discussed above, such district court certification of transfer
decisions rarely occurs. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
362 Instead, the Court remanded the case to the district- court for a reconsideration
of the district judge's transfer decision, in light of the majority's other rulings. Stewart
Oiganization, 487 U.S. at 32.
363 The Stewart majority held:
A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) thus calls on the District Court to weigh
in the balance a number of case-specific factors. The presence of a forum-
selection clause such as the parties entered into in this case will be a significant
factor that figures centrally in the District Courts calculus . . . . The flexible
and individualized analysis Congress prescribed in § 1404(a) thus encompasses
consideration of the parties' private expression of their venue preferences.
Id. at 29.
364 Of course, the plaintiff also must satisfy subject matter jurisdiction and proper
venue requirements. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1366 (1988) (specifying subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403 (1988) '(venue restrictions ap-
plicable in the federal courts).
365 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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clause specified that any suit arising out of the contract "must be
treated before the London [England] Court of Justice. -" 61
While Unterwesser's ship, The Bremen, was towing Zapata's
barge from Louisiana to Italy, a heavy storm arose in the Gulf of
Mexico. The barge sustained serious damage, and Zapata instruct-
ed the crew of The Bremen to dock at Tampa, Florida, the near-
est port.367 Zapata susbsequently brought an admiralty suit in
the federal district court for the Middle District of Florida, alleg-
ing that Unterwesser's breach of contract and negligence had
damaged the Zapata barge.
The Bremen Court stated that the Middle District of Florida
court could not hear the suit brought by Zapata, if the forum
selection clause was enforceable. The Court held that only the
court specified in a valid forum selection clause could resolve a
dispute between parties who had agreed to such a provision. The
Bremen Court concluded that the regular enforcement of forum
selection clauses would add an element of certainty to litigation,
and that such certainty constitutes "an indispensable element in
international trade, commerce, and contracting." 6 '
The Court noted that forum selection clauses would not be
enforced if "unreasonable and unjust," or if procured by "fraud
or overreaching." '69 The justices thus remanded the case to the
district court, which would determine whether the forum selection
clause designating a London court was enforceable. 370 But, given
the strong public policy involved, a party challenging the validity
of a forum clause must make "a strong showing that it should be
set aside."1
71
The Bremen decision thus holds that, where parties have pro-
vided a forum selection clause in a contract, only the court speci-
fied in that clause may resolve a controversy between the parties.
It is possible to read The Bremen decision as applying only to
international admiralty cases.372 Most courts, however, have in-
terpreted this case as establishing a rule applicable to all civil'
suits. 373 Such a reading receives support from the broad lan-
366 Id. at 2.
367 Id. at 3.
368 Id. at 13-14.
369 Id. at 15.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 See id. at 17 (noting that The Bremen controversy did not involve "an agreement
between two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien fo-
rum").
373 See, e.g., Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838
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guage in the majority opinion.374 This interpretation also follows
from subsequent decisions referring cases initially filed in federal
court to arbitration panels, which have characterized'a prior arbi-
tration agreement between the parties as "a specialized kind of
forum selection clause."
375
The decisions in Stewart Organization and Bremen result in an
inexplicable divergence between the law of personal jurisdiction
and the law governing section 1404 transfers. Assume that two
parties have entered into an enforceable forum selection clause.
Assume also that the plaintiff has brought suit in a district other
than the court specified by the clause. If the defendant moves to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, under Bremen the district
court must enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss the
suit. But if the defendant instead moves to transfer the case un-
der section 1404 to the district specified in the forum selection
clause, the court need not grant this motion. Instead, the court
must only weigh the forum selection clause together with "a num-
ber of case-specific factors." 76
In a Stewart Organization concurring opinion, Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy apparently recognized this divergence. Justice Kenne-
dy asserted that the federal courts' ruling on section 1404(a) mo-
tions should insure that "a valid forum selection clause is given
controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases."377 -
This Article proposes a more straightforward rule than sug-
gested in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Simply put, where a
valid forum selection clause applies to a controversy, a court
should be required to transfer the case to the district specified in
F.2d 656, 659-60 (2d Cir. 1988) (New Jersey corporation could not sue New York corpo-
ration in federal court, where a valid forum selection clause authorized suit only in New
York state court); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 280-
81 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming enforcement of a valid forum selection clause, in a dispute
between New York and Pennsyvania corporations). See also Gruson, Forum Selection Claus-
es in International and Inteistate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 149
(1982).
374 407 U.S. at 9-15. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
n.14 (1985) ("Where such forum-selecion provisions have been obtained through 'freely
negotiated' agreements and are not 'unreasonable and unjust' ... their enforcement
does not offend due process.").
375 Rodriguez de Qulias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921
(1989) (agreement to arbitrate federal securities claim is enforceable); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) (authorizing arbitration
of federal antitrust claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (re-
quiring arbitration of federal securities claims).
376 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 29, 29 (1988).
377 Id. at 33.
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the forum selection clause. This rule would harmonize the law
governing section 1404 transfers and the law governing personal
jurisdiction motions. Such a rule also would make transfer deci-
sions more predictable and consistent.
B. Limitations of the Suggested Approach
Critics might assert that the suggested approach does not
actually change the balancing methodology used by the district
courts, but instead merely emphasizes different factors from those
currently relied upon. District courts still must engage in balanc-
ing to decide a transfer motion, and thus in some situations the
suggested approach will not produce certain results.
Consider the situation where a plaintiff has filed suit in the
Southern District of New York, and the single party defending the
suit seeks a transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania. 78
Seventy percent of the plaintiffs witnesses and documents are
located in the New York district, and thirty percent of these wit-
nesses and documents will be found in the Pennsylvania district.
Conversely, thirty percent of the defendant's witnesses and docu-
ments are located in the New York district, and seventy percent
of these witnesses and documents will be found in the
Pennsylvania district.
The suggested approach does not provide a clear answer to
whether a district court should transfer this hypothetical case. A
decision either granting or denying a section 1404 transfer would
be appropriate. The suggested approach would not entirely elimi-
nate uncertainty or discretion from transfer decisions.
But under the suggested approach, cases involving such un-
certainty and discretion would arise far more rarely than under
the current balancing test. Regardless of the analysis used to
reach any legal decision, some hard cases will arise and the test
will not dictate a particular result. Under the suggested approach,
such hard cases will arise only in relatively rare instances, when
documents and witnesses are dispersed equally among two or
more districts. Under the current approach to section 1404 mo-
tions, almost every transfer motion constitutes a hard case, re-
solved through significant district court discretion.
378 This hypothetical assumes that the plaintiff possesses minimum contacts with the
Western District of Pennsylvania. Under the suggested approach, the New York court
thus could transfer the case to the Pennsylvania district. See supra text accompanying
notes 346-55.
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A different criticism of the suggested approach might assert
not that the approach fails to achieve the goal of limiting district
court discretion, but that this goal is inappropriate. While this
Article asserts that many factors currently reviewed in deciding
motions to transfer should be irrelevant,"7 9 one might respond
that in certain cases one of these factors might prove relevant to
a just determination. A district judge, using her discretion, should
determine when a factor is relevant, and when the factor is unim-
portant. In short, one might argue that the suggested approach
inappropriately limits district court discretion.8
One response to this argument is that the current system,
which leaves transfer decisions almost entirely to the discretion of
the district judges, has not worked particularly well. In addition,
as discussed above, the suggested approach will not completely
deprive the district courts of discretion. Instead, the suggested
approach limits district court discretion to cases actually present-
ing a close question on the relative convenience of two different
districts.
The suggested approach thus would not eliminate all district
court discretion from section 1404 decisions. But unlike the cur-
rent method for resolving section 1404 transfers, the suggested
approach would provide standards governing the appropriate
exercise of district court discretion. The suggested approach not
only would promote greater predictability and certainty in transfer
decisions, but also would make these decisions easier and less
time-consuming for the overburdened district judge.
V. CONCLUSION
The section 1404 transfer illustrates how modern federal
court litigation may distort a facially reasonable proposal into a
cumbersome and costly procedure with few real beneficiaries. The
transfer motion represents an obstacle to a plaintiff seeking a
quick resolution of his suit. The section 1404 transfer results in
379 See supra text accompanying notes 237-319.
380 This argument would receive support from Supreme Court decisions which have
repeatedly emphasized that transfer decisions should be left to the discretion of district
judges. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 29, 29 (1988) ("Section
1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the District Court to adjudicate motions for
transfer according to an 'individualized case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.'"); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) (when a district judge considers
a § 1404 transfer, "the discretion to be exercised is broader" than under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens). See also supra text accompanying notes 47-77.
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little benefit to district courts, but instead imposes one more
complex motion on already backlogged district judges.
Civil defendants will gain some benefits in delay through the
use of section 1404 motions. But such delay comes at a price,
because defendants must pay their counsel to research and draft
transfer motions. In the end, the only individuals who receive
substantial benefits from section 1404 motions may be members
of the private bar, who have the opportunity to earn a substantial
fee from complex transfer litigation.
Given the congresssional purpose embodied in section 1404,
the added burden imposed on federal litigants and judges by
transfer motions is indeed ironic. As stated in the plain language
of the statute, Congress intended section 1404 transfers to pro-
mote "[t]he convenience of parties and witnesses" and to serve
"the interest of justice."3'81 Today, the transfer motion promotes
neither convenience nor justice.
Nonetheless, this Article maintains that the motion to transfer
may serve its intended purposes, if courts no longer decide such
motions through a vague balancing that results in unrestricted
judicial discretion.38 Part IV of this Article suggests that courts
abandon their reliance on the many irrelevant factors currently
considered in transfer analysis. Instead, courts should decide the
majority of transfer motions by considering only one factor-the
location of relevant witnesses and documents.
This approach would simplify transfer motions, making trans-
fer litigation less expensive for the parties and easier for the dis-
trict courts to resolve. The approach would reduce the number of
transfer motions, by defining numerous situations where a defen-
dant could not make a colorable transfer argument. The simplicity
of this approach would reduce the unpredictability of transfer
decisions, and promote consistency among the district courts.
Finally, a more limited district court discretion would allow for
meaningful appellate review of transfer decisions.
A number of actors deserve some responsibility for the cur-
rent problems generated by the section 1404 transfer. Congress
381 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
382 Abolishing the § 1404 transfer would represent a more extreme suggestion. At
least one commentator has suggested that the courts abolish forum non conveniens dis-
missals. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1263 ("the doctrine of forum non conveniens has
outlived its usefulness"); see also id. at 1321-24. Cf. Stein, supra note 3, at 842 (although
forum non conveniens dismissals raise serious problems, "[t]he solution is not necessarily
the elimination of the forum non conveniens doctrine").
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enacted a vague and urilluminating statute when it adopted sec-
tion 1404. Defendants have filed too many unmeritorious transfer
motions. District courts have granted too many unwarranted trans-
fers. And legal scholars have not addressed the growing body of
inconsistent transfer decisions.
But the Supreme Court deserves the primary responsibility
for the expense and confusion that accompanies the section 1404
transfer. In this area, the Court simply has abdicated its function
of providing meaningful standards for federal litigants and courts.
The justices rarely have discussed the section 1404 motion. The
infrequent Court opinions have not suggested any useful stan-
dards, instead encouraging a simplistic deference to district court
discretion.
Section 1404 transfer motions need not generate unpredict-
able and confusing decisions. But, for section 1404 to serve the
purposes envisioned by Congress, the Supreme Court must begin
to formulate clear and specific rules governing the transfer of civil
cases.
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